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INTRODUCTION
However history ultimately judges Edward Snowden, his 2013 revelations regarding secret bulk collection of domestic phone records
by the National Security Agency (“NSA”) eroded many Americans’
trust in their government, as well as their confidence in the privacy of
1
their electronic conversations. Americans were shocked and angered to learn that their government had been collecting all kinds of
information about their communications, without serious judicial supervision and when most or all of the data was domestic. Fears that
America had turned into a surveillance state fueled sales of encryp2
tion technology and were reflected in both the media and popular
3
culture.

1

2

3

See, e.g., Pew Research Center, Public Perceptions of Privacy and Security in the Post-Snowden
Era, 23–25 (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2014/11/PI_Public
PerceptionsofPrivacy_111214.pdf [hereinafter Pew 2014 Study] (finding that, with respect
to landline phones, cell phones, text messaging, instant messaging, email, and social media messaging, “there is not one mode through which a majority of the American public
feels ‘very secure’ sharing private information with another trusted person or organization”).
See e.g., Bill Flook, There’s No Business Like Snowden Business, WASH. BUS. J. (July 25, 2014),
http://www.bizjournals.com/washington/print-edition/2014/07/25/theres-no-businesslike-snowden-business.html?page=all (describing how consumer interest in encryption
technology increased following the Snowden disclosures).
Journalists covering the Snowden revelations inevitably invoked George Orwell. See PEN
Surveillance Mapping Metaphor Project, PEN American Ctr., http://www.pen.org/
infographic/pen-surveillance-metaphor-mapping-project (illustrating that Orwell’s novel
1984 was the only literary work referred to in the PEN America survey).
Government surveillance also inspired art exhibits, songs, and even a popular Hollywood children’s movie. See, e.g., Peter Maass, Art in a Time of Surveillance, First Look, THE
INTERCEPT, Nov. 13, 2014, https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/11/13/artsurveillance-explored-artists; John Hanlon, Why The LEGO Movie is the new Nineteen
Eighty-Four, THE WEEK, Feb. 7, 2014, http://theweek.com/article/index/256154/whythe-lego-movie-is-the-new-nineteen-eighty-four (comparing the influence of government
surveillance in Orwell’s 1984 and The LEGO Movie); Rock, Paper, Cynic, Hello NSA (A Love
Song of Mass Surveillance), YOUTUBE (Feb. 11, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=Eiu-7Ij6CWI.
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After two years of public debate and political grandstanding, Con4
gress finally enacted the USA FREEDOM Act, and news reports
trumpeted the end of government bulk collection of American tele5
phone records. No longer could the government use Section 215 of
6
the USA PATRIOT Act to force telecommunications providers to deliver to the NSA, on a daily basis, the “metadata”—transmittal infor7
mation including the numbers dialed, time, date, and duration —
8
associated with most Americans’ phone calls. Both President Barack
9
Obama and Edward Snowden applauded the passage of the new law,
10
the latter calling it “a historic victory for the rights of every citizen.”
4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ending Eavesdropping,
Dragnet-Collection, and Online Monitoring Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat.
268, codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2015) [hereinafter Freedom Act].
See, e.g., David Cole, Reining in the NSA, N.Y. TIMES REV. OF BOOKS (June 2, 2015),
http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2015/jun/02/nsa-surveillance-congress-sunset;
Sabrina Siddiqui, Congress Passes NSA Surveillance Reform in Vindication for Snowden, THE
GUARDIAN (June 3, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jun/02/
congress-surveillance-reform-edward-snowden.
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified in scattered titles of the U.S.C.) [hereinafter Patriot Act]. Section 215 of the Patriot Act
amended the “business records” provision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18
and 50 U.S.C.) [hereinafter FISA]. The business records provision authorizes the FBI Director or a designee to seek:
an order requiring the production of any tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents, and other items) for an investigation to obtain intelligence information not concerning a United States person or to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such
investigation of a United States person is not conducted solely upon the basis of
activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution.
Patriot Act, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a). The application for such authority need only “specify that the records concerned are sought for an authorized investigation . . . to obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person
or to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.” Id.,
codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2).
See David Medine et al., Report on the Telephone Records Program Conducted Under Section 215
of the USA PATRIOT Act and on the Operations of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, Privacy & Civil Liberties Oversight Bd. 8 (2014), https://www.pclob.gov/library/215Report_on_the_Telephone_Records_Program.pdf [hereinafter PCLOB Section 215 Report] (defining “metadata” for phone calls and emails).
To be more precise, the Freedom Act authorized the government to restart the former
Section 215 program and operate it for six months while the NSA and the telecommunications providers transition to the new, Freedom Act system. Freedom Act, supra note 4,
at § 109(a).
See Jennifer Steinhauer & Jonathan Weisman, U.S. Surveillance in Place Since 9/11 is Sharply
Limited, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2015, at A1 (noting that “Mr. Obama was quick to praise passage of the legislation and to scold those who opposed it”).
Edward J. Snowden, Edward Snowden: The World Says No to Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, June 5,
2015, at A27.
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Politicians and professors labeled the Freedom Act the most significant surveillance reform in decades, describing it as a reflection of
the popular belief that the government has no business spying on
11
Americans’ calls. Some went so far as to give credit to Snowden for
launching a debate that led to legislative reform, resulting in a para12
digmatic example of the democratic process at work.
In fact, however, these laudatory remarks overstate what the Freedom Act actually accomplished. While the new law imposes some
limits on the government’s ability to gather Americans’ domestic
communications records under the Patriot Act, the Freedom Act
leaves untouched the government’s power to collect most (if not all)
of these same records under other legal authorities. These other laws
13
include Executive Order (“EO 12333”), issued by President Ronald
Reagan in 1981, which sets out an expansive framework under which
the nation’s intelligence agencies engage in surveillance activities
conducted outside U.S. borders without judicial involvement or
14
meaningful congressional oversight. Although Title VII of the For-

11

12

13

14

See, e.g., Erin Kelly, Senate Approves USA Freedom Act, USA TODAY (June 2, 2015),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2015/06/02/patriot-act-usa-freedom-actsenate-vote/28345747 (“Americans are no longer willing to give the intelligence agencies
a blank check.”); Peter Swire, The USA FREEDOM Act, the President’s Review Group and the
Biggest Intelligence Reform in 40 Years, PRIVACY PERSPECTIVES (June 8, 2015),
https://privacyassociation.org/news/a/the-usa-freedom-act-the-presidents-review-groupand-the-biggest-intelligence-reform-in-40-years/ (calling the USA FREEDOM Act the
“biggest pro-privacy change to U.S. intelligence law since the original enactment of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act in 1978”).
See, e.g., Cole, supra note 5; Jessica Shulberg, The Elephant in the Room: Senators Finally Credit Snowden For Role in Patriot Act Reforms, HUFFINGTON POST (June 1, 2015),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/06/01/snowden-nsa-patriot-act_n_7485702.html.
Exec. Order No. 12333, 3 C.F.R. 200 (1981), amended by Exec. Order No. 13284, 3
C.F.R. 161 (2003); Exec. Order No. 13355, 3 C.F.R. 218 (2004); and Exec. Order No.
13470, 3 C.F.R. 218 (2008) [hereinafter EO 12333]. EO 12333 explains that, under its
auspices, “[a]ll means, consistent with applicable Federal law and this order, and with full
consideration of the rights of United States persons, shall be used to obtain reliable intelligence information to protect the United States and its interests.” Id. §1.1(a). Its provisions are implemented by individual intelligence agencies pursuant to guidelines that
must be approved by the Attorney General. Id. § 3.2.
The full text of EO 12333, as amended, is available online. See, e.g., EO 12333,
http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-12333-2008.pdf.
See Nat’l Sec. Agency, Memorandum: The National Security Agency: Missions, Authorities, Oversight and Partnerships, 2 (Aug. 9, 2013), https://www.nsa.gov/public_info/_files/speeches_testimonies/2013_08_09_the_nsa_story.pdf [hereinafter NSA
Memorandum] (stating that EO 12333 applies when surveillance is “conducted through
various means around the globe, largely from outside the United States, which is not otherwise regulated by FISA”).
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eign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (“FISA”) 15 forbids the government from intentionally targeting a U.S. person’s foreign com16
munications without a FISA warrant, bulk collection of communica17
tions from abroad is regarded by the NSA as not targeting anyone.
These large-scale collections under EO 12333 cannot avoid “incidentally” harvesting sizeable quantities of U.S. person communications, including, for example, both content and metadata of calls
made by Americans to or from a foreign country, or even purely domestic communications that travel over international cables or are
18
stored on backup servers located in foreign countries. For this reason, EO 12333 has been described as a legal loophole by which the
NSA can avoid complying with FISA or the Fourth Amendment even
19
as the agency intercepts communications belonging to Americans.
Although by passing the Freedom Act, Congress has showed itself
willing to make changes to the surveillance state, the surveillers have
yet to be reined in.
All government surveillance programs create communications
privacy concerns, whether the snooping consists of a government
agent opening a sealed letter, wiretapping a telephone, pretending to
be a criminal suspect’s trusted friend, or collecting and analyzing
communications metadata. When we communicate with others, both
the right to privacy and the right of free expression are put in play.
Communications privacy promotes both individual and societal values; it enables us to engage in meaningful social interactions that are
essential to both the creation of intimate personal relationships and
the maintenance of a flourishing political system. Logically, then, it
would follow that in America we ought to accord significant constitutional protection, based on both the Fourth and First Amendments,
to the privacy of our communications.
Generally, however, questions regarding the ability of speakers to
20
exclude the “uninvited ear” of the government from our communications have been treated by courts as governed entirely by the
Fourth Amendment, not the First. If the surveillance in question
qualifies as a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment, any
First Amendment implications are adequately addressed, according
15
16
17
18
19
20

Title VII was added to the original FISA in the FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L.
110-161, 122 Stat. 2436 (July 10, 2008).
FISA, supra note 6, at § 1881c(a)(2).
See infra notes 77–79 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 80–81 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 82–88 and accompanying text.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
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to the Court, if the government obtains a warrant. 21 If the surveillance does not rise to the level of a search or seizure because the government collects only non-content communications metadata that
22
the speaker shared with a third party, not even a warrant is required.
Nevertheless, scholars have repeatedly called for recognition of a
First Amendment right to be free from government surveillance,
whether because it interferes with the freedom of thought necessary
23
for what Professor Neil Richards has termed “intellectual privacy,”
or, because as Professor Katherine Strandburg has argued, surveillance that reveals citizens’ organizational ties violates freedom of as24
sociation. So far, these arguments have failed to gain much traction. Declassified Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC” or
“FISA court”) opinions that authorized bulk collection of communications metadata under FISA either rejected any First Amendment
25
objections or failed to mention them at all. While several lawsuits
challenging surveillance programs have raised First Amendment
claims, those arguments either did not prevail or were not addressed
26
by courts.
My central theme is that the First Amendment should be considered in partnership with the Fourth so that both play a role in determining the constitutionality of bulk government surveillance of our
communications. Given the development of the law and the constraints of precedent, neither Amendment will, on its own, provide
21
22
23
24
25

26

See infra notes 324–29 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 141–49, 181–86 and accompanying text.
See Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1935 (2013).
See Katherine J. Strandburg, Membership Lists, Metadata, and Freedom of Association’s Specificity Requirement, 10 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 327, 332 (2014).
See, e.g., Opinion and Order, [Redacted], No. PR/TT [Redacted] at 66-69 (FISA Ct. [Redacted] 2004) (Kollar-Kotelly, J.), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/836336cleanedprtt-1.html [hereinafter Kollar-Kotelly Opinion] (holding that NSA bulk collection of email and Internet metadata under Section 214 of the Patriot Act did not violate
the First Amendment); Amended Memorandum Opinion, In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things
From [Redacted], No. BR 13-109 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013) (Eagan, J.), http://
www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/br13-09-primary-order.pdf [hereinafter Eagan
opinion] (upholding Section 215 program under the Fourth Amendment with no mention of the First Amendment).
See, e.g., ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 821 n.12 (2d Cir. 2015) (deciding the cases without reaching the First Amendment issue); United States v. Mohamud, No. 3:10-CR-00475KI-1, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85452, at *30–38 (D. Ore. June 24, 2014) (holding that surveillance under Section 702 of FISA did not violate the First Amendment because the
Fourth Amendment was satisfied); Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9–10 n.7
(D.D.C. 2013) (enjoining operation of Section 215 program on Fourth Amendment
grounds, without reaching the First Amendment claim), rev’d, 800 F.3d 559 (D.C. Cir.
2015).

Feb. 2016]

SYNERGY OF PRIVACY AND SPEECH

819

sufficient protection against the government with respect to communications privacy. My specific focus here is on government collection
27
and analysis of communications metadata under EO 12333. While
the Freedom Act represents a small step by Congress to improve our
communications privacy, it did nothing to resolve the great constitutional metadata debate. It leaves intact the government’s overarching legal theory that when the NSA collects communications
metadata and uses it to map out our contacts and social networks
28
(what the NSA calls “contact chaining” ), the agency resides in a
29
Constitution-free zone.
In Part I, I give a brief overview of the Freedom Act, and contrast
it with what we know about the government’s ability incidentally to
collect domestic communications pursuant to EO 12333. While the
Freedom Act places some restraints on the NSA’s ability to hold and
analyze domestic metadata, most of the public remains unaware that
EO 12333 provides an alternate authority for the NSA to engage in
many of the same activities while bypassing any statutory or constitutional limitations.
In Part II, I describe how communications privacy developed under the Fourth rather than the First Amendment. I show how the
Court’s reasonable expectation of privacy test from the electronic
eavesdropping cases, combined with the assumption of the risk concept developed in the false friend cases evolved into the notorious
third party doctrine. This much-criticized legal principle forms the
basis for the government’s constitutional argument justifying bulk
27

28
29

This is not to discount the importance of the First and Fourth Amendments with respect
to government collection of communication content. However, when the government
collects communications content under FISA or, to a more limited extent, under EO
12333, certain minimization requirements apply that limit the acquisition, retention, and
dissemination of non-publicly available U.S. person information. See infra notes 91–93 and
accompanying text. Whether those protections adequately safeguard First and Fourth
Amendment interests is a topic for another day; for present purposes, I note that minimization procedures regarding the analysis of communications metadata collected under
EO 12333 are much less robust. See infra notes 94–109 and accompanying text.
For a comprehensive analysis of the statutory and constitutional issues regarding international collection of communications content under FISA, see generally Laura K.
Donohue, Section 702 and the Collection of International Telephone and Internet Content, 38
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 117 (2015).
See PCLOB Section 215 Report, supra note 7, at 26–31 (explaining the contact chaining
process in the context of the former Section 215 telephony metadata program).
See ADMIN. WHITE PAPER: BULK COLLECTION OF TELEPHONY METADATA UNDER SECTION
215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT 19–22 (2013), https://info.publicintelligence.net/DoJNSABulkCollection.pdf [hereinafter ADMIN. WHITE PAPER] (defending former Section
215 telephony metadata program as constitutional under both the Fourth and First
Amendments).
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collection and analysis of domestic metadata in general, and under
30
EO 12333 in particular. Although commentators have made strong
and thoughtful arguments as to why the third party doctrine should
31
be jettisoned as a relic of a bygone era, whether the Supreme Court
is ready to do so remains uncertain.
Part III explains why stand-alone First Amendment challenges to
bulk government collection of communications metadata are also unlikely to succeed. Government monitoring of our communications
activity, including gathering and analyzing communications metadata, would logically seem to inhibit speech. However, chilling effects
by themselves are not a sufficient injury to support a First Amendment claim, and government surveillance programs neither prohibit
32
nor punish speech. Associational privacy claims provide a somewhat
stronger argument, but without evidence of retaliation or other nega33
tive effects, they are also likely to fail. As a result, even massive surveillance programs that collect and analyze communications metadata belonging to U.S. persons, such as the little-known EO 12333, are
unlikely to be struck down as violations of the First Amendment.
In Part IV, I describe how the Supreme Court has, nevertheless,
recognized the salience of First Amendment values when the government interferes with our communications privacy. In particular, I
34
focus on United States v. U.S. District Court (the “Keith” case), where
the Court indicated that when the government captures communications content in national security cases, the First Amendment should
be read in conjunction with the Fourth Amendment to provide par35
ties to those communications with heightened privacy protections.
This, I believe, will provide a path for the Court to reevaluate and
limit the third party doctrine with respect to dragnet government collection of communications metadata without overruling the doctrine
entirely. By determining that communications metadata associated
with U.S. person communications that the NSA happens to capture
abroad—whether because an American called a person in a foreign
country, or because a wholly domestic communication traveled
through a transoceanic cable—are relevant to foreign intelligence investigations such that they can be captured and contact-chained
without limit, the government has engaged in an end-run around
30
31
32
33
34
35

See infra notes 181–88 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 153–54 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 241–61 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 262–79 and accompanying text.
407 U.S. 297 (1972).
Id. at 313–14.
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Keith’s holding that it must procure a warrant to engage in electronic
surveillance of U.S. citizens with “no significant connection with a
36
foreign power, its agents or agencies.”
Whether a constitutional challenge to bulk incidental collection
of domestic metadata under EO 12333 will ever be heard by the Supreme Court is another matter. Standing doctrine as currently applied by the Court has prohibited constitutional review of surveillance
programs where the plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that their commu37
nications were, in fact, gathered or scrutinized by the government.
Many have argued that in the context of massive government surveillance programs, the Court should loosen standing requirements and
recognize a broader range of harms to ensure that those programs do
38
not escape judicial review. Given the serious implications that unchecked executive branch surveillance power presents to privacy,
speech, and our democratic process, this would be a welcome development. Courts must abandon overly narrow views of standing that
make it impossible to challenge clear violations of law.
In the meantime, however, I conclude by calling for both Congress and the executive branch to act to bring the NSA’s incidental
collection of domestic communications metadata under EO 12333
more in line with the Fourth and First Amendments. As a start, both
Congress and the public need as much information as national security permits regarding the scope and efficacy of those collection efforts. Additionally, I sketch out further congressional and executive
branch reforms that would provide meaningful privacy protections to
American communication records that the government currently can
harvest from abroad. If enacted, these reforms would help create a
world in which we need not fear that the government collects, analyzes, and stores the records of our everyday communications simply because, thanks to technology, those records can be obtained from foreign sources.

36
37
38

Id. at 309 n.8.
Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA,133 S. Ct. 1138, 1148 (2013). See infra notes 280–307 and
accompanying text.
See, e.g., Richards, supra note 23, at 1963 (proposing that the Supreme Court should recognize surveillance of intellectual activities as a harm in standing doctrine); Christopher
Slobogin, Standing and Covert Surveillance, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 517, 519–20 (2015) (urging
that the Court treat challenges to government surveillance as presenting cognizable
claims under political process theory).

822

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 18:3

I. UNDERSTANDING THE USA FREEDOM ACT AND
EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333
In June 2013, Edward Snowden made worldwide headlines when
he revealed that the NSA had implemented sweeping surveillance of
39
Americans under Section 215 of the Patriot Act. That month, The
Guardian published a top secret order from the FISC directing a major U.S. telephone company to turn over to the NSA, on a daily basis,
40
millions of its customers’ call records. The order, leaked by Snowden, compelled Verizon to deliver to the NSA the telephony metadata relating to all domestic calls, as well as all calls with one end in the
41
United States, for a three-month period. Within weeks, the government was forced to admit not only the program’s continued existence, but also that it been first approved by the FISC in 2006, that
similar FISC orders had been issued to other major American telecommunications providers, and that those orders had been continu42
The result was instant notoriety for Snowden,
ally reauthorized.
shock and disbelief on the part of many Americans, and the standard
invocation of terrorism prevention as a justification by the Obama
43
Administration. Metadata, once a term familiar only to information
technologists and data analysts, entered the standard American vocabulary.
Following the Snowden disclosures, Congress seemed eager to
pass legislation to curb the NSA’s ability to spy on Americans; more
than twenty bills were introduced for the purpose of limiting NSA
44
surveillance powers. It took until June 2015, however, for the Freedom Act to become law—two days after Section 215 technically had

39

40

41
42

43

44

See Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily, THE
GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsaphone-records-verizon-court-order.
The Guardian published the full text of the FISC order. See Verizon Forced to Turn Over Telephone Data—Full Court Ruling, THE GUARDIAN, June 5, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com
/world/interactive/2013/jun/06/verizon-telephone-data-court-order.
Id.
See Letter from James R. Clapper, Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, to Sen. Ron Wyden,
http://www.wyden.senate.gov/download/?id=285dc9e7-195a-4467-b0fecaa857fc4e0d&download=1; ADMIN. WHITE PAPER, supra note 29, at 2.
ADMIN. WHITE PAPER, supra note 29, at 3 (stating that telephony metadata collection program was designed to “close critical intelligence gaps that were highlighted by the September 11, 2001 attacks.”).
Ryan Gallagher, U.S. Lawmakers Launch Assault on NSA Domestic Snooping, SLATE (Oct. 29,
2013),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/10/29/sensenbrenner_and_leahy_s_us
a_freedom_act_seeks_to_curb_nsa_domestic_spying.html.
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expired. 45 In this Part, I briefly outline the provisions of the Freedom
Act, and contrast them with what we know about government’s ability
to collect and analyze communications metadata under EO 12333.
A. The USA Freedom Act
Of the various surveillance bills introduced in Congress, the original 2013 version of the Freedom Act was considered to be among the
46
most comprehensive. However, by the end of 2014, the House had
significantly weakened the bill’s privacy protections, and the bill
47
stalled in the Senate. In April 2015, with Section 215’s May 31 sunset date looming, legislators introduced a revised version of the Free48
dom Act in the House and Senate judiciary committees. Despite
fervent opposition by both reformers and surveillance hawks in the
Senate, this version ultimately won congressional approval and was
49
signed by the President.
Effective 180 days after its enactment, the Freedom Act forbids the
government from indiscriminately collecting telephony metadata in
50
bulk under Section 215. As of November 29, 2015, the Freedom Act
established a new framework under which call detail records will re51
main with the telecommunications companies. If the government
can demonstrate a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a “specific
selection term”—i.e. a person’s name or account number—is associated with international terrorism, the FISC may issue an order requir45

46
47
48

49
50
51

When the Senate in a rare Sunday session failed to reauthorize or reform Section 215
before its sunset date, intelligence officials said they shut the telephony metadata program down for the first time in fourteen years. See Lisa Mascaro, NSA Bulk Collection of
Phone Data Stops; Senate Fails to Act Before Deadline, L.A. TIMES (May 31, 2015),
http://www.latimes.com/nation/politics/politicsnow/la-na-senate-nsa-20150531story.html#page=1. The Freedom Act restored the government’s ability to operate the
former Section 215 program for six months while the government and telecommunications providers transition to the new system. Freedom Act, supra note 4, at § 109(a).
See Gallagher, supra note 44.
Charlie Savage & Jeremy W. Peters, Move to Restrict Data Collection Blocked G.O.P., N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 19, 2014, at A1, A15.
Spencer Ackerman, NSA Reform Bill Imperilled as it Competes with Alternative Effort in the Senate, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 28, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/
apr/28/house-nsa-reform-bill-senate-usa-freedom-act.
Jennifer Steinhauer & Jonathan Weisman, U.S. Surveillance in Place Since 9/11 Is Sharply
Limited, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2015, at A1.
Freedom Act, supra note 4, at §§ 103, 109(a).
For a discussion of whether having the private sector keep domestic telephony metadata
reduces or increases the risks to individual privacy, see David E. Pozen, Privacy-Privacy
Trade-Offs, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (“[K]eeping the metadata with the private sector or with some newly created entity might merely shift the locus and expand the
scope of the privacy threat, at least if the implementing rules are not well designed.”).
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ing the phone companies to produce, on an ongoing, daily basis, call
52
records within two degrees of separation from the selection term.
(The first “hop” worth of call records includes all calls made by or to
the suspect number. A second “hop” would provide the NSA with
records of all calls made or received by each number identified in the
first “hop.”) Ongoing production orders are limited to 180 days, alt53
hough, as before, those orders can be extended with FISC approval.
Additionally, the Freedom Act requires the government to promptly
destroy all call detail records determined to be irrelevant to foreign
54
intelligence, and allows FISC judges to impose additional minimization procedures to protect nonpublic information concerning U.S.
55
persons.
Under Title II of the Freedom Act, the government is foreclosed
from using the pen register/trap and trace provisions of the Patriot
56
Act as an alternate means to implement bulk metadata collection.
Section 201 of the Freedom Act provides that the government may
only apply for a pen register or trap and trace device on the basis of a
“specific selection term,” which is defined to exclude broad terms
57
such as zip codes, or the names of cities or computing services. This
provision is particularly important because the NSA relied on the Patriot Act pen register/trap and trace provisions as authority to collect
58
a huge amount of domestic email metadata from 2004 to 2011. Title V of the Freedom Act limits the national security letter program in
the same fashion, prohibiting the government from obtaining a na59
tional security letter except upon application based on a specific
60
identifier.
52
53
54
55
56

57
58

59

Freedom Act, supra note 4, at § 101.
Id.
Id.
Id. at § 104(a)(3).
Id. at §§ 201–02. In the pre-Patriot Act era, a pen register was a device that recorded the
numbers dialed from a particular phone, and a trap and trace device recorded the numbers of incoming calls received by a particular phone. The Patriot Act amended FISA to
expand these definitions to include devices that capture the dialing, routing, addressing,
or signaling information related to electronic and Internet communications, as well as
standard telephone calls. Patriot Act, supra note 6, at § 214.
Freedom Act, supra note 4, at § 201.
The FISC authorized the email metadata program even though it involved the collection
of “an enormous volume of communications, the large majority of which will be unrelated to international terrorism” and that would include “communications of United States
persons located within the United States who are not the subject of any FBI investigation.” See Kollar-Kotelly Opinion, supra note 25, at 28, 39. For a more detailed description
of this program, see PCLOB Section 215 Report, supra note 7, at 38–40.
National security letters, which are authorized under four federal statutes, are written
directives by which the FBI can compel telephone companies, Internet service providers,
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Title VI imposes detailed disclosure and reporting requirements
on the government regarding the extent of surveillance activities under FISA. Under Section 601 of the Freedom Act, the Attorney General must provide an expanded annual report to Congress that includes the total number of applications made, granted, and denied
for daily production of call detail records under the new framework
61
described above. Furthermore, the DNI must furnish an annual report to the public identifying, among other things, the total number
of FISA court orders issued for electronic surveillance, call detail records, and pen registers and trap and trace devices, as well as a good
62
faith estimate of the number of targets of those orders. Finally, Title
VII of the Freedom Act provides that the new surveillance framework
63
remains in effect until December 15, 2019.
While the Freedom Act’s supporters hailed the new law as a historic limitation on the government’s surveillance powers as well as a res64
toration of Americans’ privacy rights, others had a less sanguine response to the statute, noting that the reforms are actually quite
65
modest. The Freedom Act curtails the NSA’s ability to gather all our
phone metadata under Section 215, but does not terminate the program, which is why many privacy and civil liberties advocates, including both the ACLU and the Tea Party, had called for Congress to al66
low the provision to expire altogether. Although the government

60
61
62
63
64

65

66

banks, credit agencies, and other institutions to produce records about their customers.
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION’S USE OF NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS: ASSESSMENT OF PROGRESS IN
IMPLEMENTING RECOMMENDATIONS AND EXAMINATION OF USE IN 2007 THROUGH 2009, at
2–3 (Aug. 2014).
Freedom Act, supra note 4, at § 501.
Id. at § 601.
Id. at § 602–03.
Id. at § 705.
See, e.g., Press Release, Sen. Patrick Leahy, Senate Passes Historic Lee-Leahy USA Freedom Act (June 2, 2015), http://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/senate-passes-historic-leeleahy-usa-freedom-act (stating that the Freedom Act will enact the most significant reforms to government since the Patriot Act and it will help to ensure the privacy rights of
all Americans).
See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 11 (quoting ACLU representative that Freedom Act failed to
achieve “comprehensive reform”); Sam Sacks, USA Freedom Act Passes House, Codifying Bulk
Collection for First Time, Critics Say, THE INTERCEPT (May 13, 2015), https://firstlook.org
/theintercept/2015/05/13/usa-freedom-act/ (noting statements by House Representatives who voted against the Freedom Act because they believed it did not go far enough to
protect civil liberties).
See John Hudson, Tea Party and ACLU Call on Congress to let Patriot Act Expire, FOREIGN
POLICY (May 29, 2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/29/tea-party-and-aclu-call-oncongress-to-let-patriot-act-expire/ (“In an extreme case of strange bedfellows, a top Tea
Party group and the American Civil Liberties Union are pressing lawmakers to allow the
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will no longer store all our telephony metadata, it will be able to access the same two-hops worth of metadata authorized under the for67
mer Section 215 program, an amount that a former NSA-analystturned-whistleblower has estimated could provide the government
68
with billions of call records. Indeed, the Office of the Director of
National Security stated in November 2015 that “the overall volume
of call detail records subject to query pursuant to court order is
greater under [the] USA FREEDOM ACT” than under the former
69
Section 215 program.
Even more importantly, the Freedom Act does not curtail the government’s power to collect communications metadata under other
laws such as EO 12333, discussed below. In this regard, statements
made by members of the intelligence community after passage of the
Freedom Act were telling. Less than two weeks after the Freedom Act
was signed into law, former NSA Director General Michael Hayden
indicated that Congress had let the NSA get off easy:
If somebody would come up to me and say, “Look, Hayden, here’s the
thing: This Snowden thing is going to be a nightmare for you guys for
about two years. And when we get all done with it, what you’re going to
be required to do is that little 215 program about American telephony
metadata—and, by the way, you can still have access to it, but you got to
go to the court and get access to it from the companies, rather than keep
70
it to yourself”—I go: “And this is it after two years? Cool!”

Given that the Freedom Act merely limits what General Hayden described as “that little 215 program” while it allows the government’s
metadata collection activities to continue under other laws, it is unsurprising that a former senior intelligence official referred to the

67

68

69

70

controversial provisions of the Patriot Act that authorize the National Security Agency’s
broad surveillance activities to expire.”).
The FISC originally authorized the NSA to gather phone records that were three “hops”
removed from the original seed identifier. See ADMIN. WHITE PAPER, supra note 29, at 3–4
(stating that under the FISC’s order, the NSA may also obtain information concerning
second and third-tier contacts of the identifier). In January 2014, President Obama indicated that going forward, the NSA would limit its contact chaining to two “hops.” See
Mark Landler & Charlie Savage, Obama Outlines Calibrated Curbs on Phone Spying, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 18, 2014, at A6.
See Steven Nelson, NSA Whistleblowers Oppose Freedom Act, Endorse Long-Shot Bill, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP. (Apr. 27, 2015), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/04/27/nsawhistleblowers-oppose-freedom-act-endorse-long-shot-bill.
See Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, Fact Sheet: Implementation of the USA
FREEDOM ACT of 2015, 3 (2015), http://www.dni.gov/files/icotr/USAFA%20Implementation%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf.
Dan Froomkin, Hayden Mocks Extent of Post-Snowden Reform: “And This is it After Two Years?
Cool!”, THE INTERCEPT (June 17, 2015), https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015
/06/17/hayden-mocks-extent-post-snowden-surveillance-reform-2-years-cool/.
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Freedom Act’s passage as “a big win for the NSA, and a huge nothing
71
burger for the privacy community.”
B. Executive Order 12333
Compare the Section 215 domestic metadata collection program
as limited by the Freedom Act with foreign data collection conducted
72
pursuant to EO 12333. EO 12333 provides the framework under
which the nation’s intelligence agencies engage in foreign intelligence gathering. Issued by President Reagan in 1981, this littleknown executive order (referred to as “twelve-triple-three”) is considered by the NSA to be the “foundational authority” pursuant to which
it collects, retains, analyzes, and disseminates signals intelligence in73
formation. To the extent that the NSA’s intelligence-gathering activities fall outside the scope of FISA, those activities are governed by
EO 12333 and have not been subject to judicial review or significant
74
Congressional oversight. Electronic surveillance conducted under
EO 12333 reportedly is huge; NSA data collection under its auspices
is said to dwarf that gathered under the former Section 215 telepho75
ny metadata program or any other FISA authority. For example, the
Washington Post reported in 2013 that under EO 12333, the NSA had
infiltrated the fiber optic connections that link Yahoo and Google’s

71

72
73

74

75

Shane Harris, ‘Big Win’ for Big Brother: NSA Celebrates the Bill That’s Designed to Cuff Them,
DAILYBEAST (May 14, 2015), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/05/14/nsaloves-the-nothing-burger-spying-reform-bill.html.
EO 12333, supra note 13.
See NSA Memorandum, supra note 14, at 2. The NSA defines “signals intelligence” as “intelligence derived from electronic signals and systems used by foreign targets, such as
communications systems, radars, and weapons systems.” Nat’l Sec. Agency Cent. Sec.
Serv., Signals Intelligence, www.nsa.gov/sigint/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2015).
See NSA Memorandum, supra note 14, at 2; see also Margo Schlanger, Intelligence Legalism
and the Nat’l Sec. Agency’s Civil Liberties Gap, 6 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 112, 130 (2015) (“For
the wide swathes of foreign intelligence surveillance that are not covered by FISA, regulation under Executive Order 12,333 occurs without judicial involvement.”); Ali Watkins,
Most of NSA’s Data Collection Authorized by Order Ronald Reagan Issued, MCCLATCHY DC (Nov.
21, 2013), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/national/national-security/
article24759289.html (quoting Sen. Dianne Feinstein that Senate Intelligence Committee has not been able to oversee EO 12333 surveillance programs “sufficiently” because
“they are under the executive branch entirely”).
See Nat’l Sec. Admin.: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113 Cong. 1 (2013)
(opening statement of Keith B. Alexander, Dir., NSA), http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/
imo/media/doc/10-2-13AlexanderTestimony.pdf (stating that the NSA conducts most of
its intelligence activities “solely pursuant to the authorities provided by Executive Order
12333”); Watkins, supra note 74.
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overseas data centers, which allowed the agency to collect more than
76
181 million communications records in a one-month period.
In a nutshell, EO 12333 authorizes the government to engage in
electronic surveillance from abroad for foreign intelligence purposes.
Specifically, Section 2.3(c) allows intelligence agencies to collect, retain, and disseminate data regarding U.S. persons that is obtained as
77
part of a lawful foreign intelligence investigation. Under FISA, the
NSA may not intentionally target a U.S. person’s foreign communica78
tions without obtaining a FISA warrant. However, “vacuum cleaner”
collection of communications from abroad is regarded by the NSA as
not targeting anyone, which means that the protections of FISA do
79
not apply. Overseas dragnet collections conducted under EO 12333
76

77

78

79

See Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Infiltrates Links to Yahoo, Google Data Centers
POST
(Oct.
30,
2013),
Worldwide,
Snowden
Documents
Say,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoogoogle-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-416611e3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html.
EO 12333, supra note 13, at § 2.3(c). Any collection, retention, or dissemination of U.S.
person information must be done in accordance with Attorney General approved procedures. Id. at § 2.3.
See 50 U.S.C. § 1881c(a)(2). Department of Defense procedures implementing EO 12333
also provide that communications of a U.S. person can be intentionally intercepted under EO 12333 if the Attorney General finds probable cause to believe that the person is
an agent of a foreign power and that the purpose of the interception is to collect significant foreign intelligence. Nat’l Sec. Agency & Cent. Sec. Serv., Classified Annex to Dept.
of Defense Procedures Under Exec. Order 12333 (Mar. 11, 2004) § 4A(1)(4),
https://www.aclu.org/files/natsec/nsa/NSA%20Core%20Intelligence%20Oversight%20
Training%20Materials.pdf [hereinafter Classified Annex] (Classified Annex starts at p.
118); see also Jonathan Mayer, Executive Order 12333 on American Soil, and Other Tales from
the FISA Frontier, WEB POLICY (Dec. 3, 2014), http://webpolicy.org/2014/12/03/eo12333-on-american-soil/.
See NSA Dir. of Civil Liberties and Privacy Office Report, NSA’s Civil Liberties and Privacy
Protections for Targeted SIGINT Activities Under Executive Order 12333 § 1 n.3 (Oct. 7,
2014) [hereinafter Targeted SIGINT Report] (defining “targeted” signals intelligence
(SIGINT) activities under EO 12333 as excluding “bulk” collection of intelligence data
that the NSA acquires without the use of specific identifiers); Margo Schlanger, US Intelligence Reforms Still Allow Plenty of Suspicionless Spying on Americans, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 13,
2015), http://justsecurity.org/20033/guest-post-intelligence-reforms-plenty-suspicionlesssurveillance-americans/ (explaining that FISA does not regulate “(a) non-targeted collection of wire communications, including communications between Americans within the
US, as long as the actual wire being tapped is located overseas, or (b) non-targeted collection of wireless communications if at least one party to the communication is located
abroad”).
In 2014, President Obama released Presidential Policy Directive 28, which limits the
purposes for which U.S. intelligence agencies can engage in bulk collection to detecting
and countering threats and activities related to (1) espionage; (2) terrorism; (3) weapons
of mass destruction; (4) cybersecurity; (5) the armed services; and (6) transnational
crime. Office of the Press Sec’y, Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-28, Signals Intelligence Activities (Jan. 17, 2014) § 2, http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/ppd-28.pdf [herein-
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cannot help but “incidentally” harvest sizeable quantities of U.S. person communications, including, for example, both content and
metadata of telephone calls made by Americans to or from a foreign
80
country, or among Americans who happen to be living, traveling, or
81
studying abroad.
These extraterritorial communications are presumed to belong to
82
foreigners who, when situated abroad, lack any Fourth Amendment
83
rights. Considering foreign-collected data to be of foreign provenance made sense in 1981 when EO 12333 was adopted, because do84
mestic and international communications could be differentiated.
Back then, phone calls between two Americans traveled over phone
lines located solely inside the United States, and therefore could not
be swept up as part of the government’s foreign surveillance activities.
Today, however, even purely domestic communications often travel

80

81

82

83
84

after PPD-28]. It further states that “in no event may signals intelligence collected in bulk
be used for the purpose of suppressing or burdening criticism or dissent.” Id. However,
the directive also provides that these limits on bulk collection “do not apply to signals intelligence data that is temporarily acquired to facilitate targeted collection.” Id. at § 2 n.5.
It is unclear whether metadata gathered under EO 12333 would be considered a “collection” under PPD-28. See infra notes 105–09 and accompanying text.
See NSA Memorandum, supra note 14, at 2 (“To the extent a person located outside the
United States communicates with someone inside the United States or someone inside
the United States communicates with a person located outside the United States those
communications could also be collected [under EO 12333].”).
See Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Records Calls of an Entire Nation, WASH. POST,
Mar. 19, 2014, A1, A16, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsasurveillance-program-reaches-into-the-past-to-retrieve-replay-phonecalls/2014/03/18/226d2646-ade9-11e3-a49e-76adc9210f19_story.html (describing NSA
voice interception program that monitors and records every phone call made within a
specified country, which also “pulls in a great deal of content from Americans who telephone, visit and work in the target country”); Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA
Tracking Cellphone Locations Worldwide, Snowden Documents Show, WASH. POST (Dec. 4,
2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-tracking-cellphonelocations-worldwide-snowden-documents-show/2013/12/04/5492873a-5cf2-11e3-bc56c6ca94801fac_story.html [hereinafter Gellman & Soltani, NSA Tracking] (quoting NSA officials confirming that the agency “incidentally” obtains location data from American cell
phones when it taps into the cables that connect mobile networks around the world, and
when Americans use their cell phones when they travel outside the United States).
For the purposes of EO 12333, “foreign communication” is defined as “a communication
that involves a sender or an intended recipient who is outside the United States or that is
entirely among foreign powers or between a foreign power and officials of a foreign power.” Classified Annex, supra note 78, at § 2. See also Axel Arnbak & Sharon Goldberg,
Loopholes for Circumventing the Constitution: Unrestrained Bulk Surveillance on Americans by
Collecting Network Traffic Abroad, 21 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 317, 321–22, 335
(2015).
See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990).
For an explanation and thoughtful critique of the notion of territoriality and the Fourth
Amendment when applied to electronic data in general, and with respect to EO 12333 in
particular, see Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L.J. 326 (2015).
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over international cables or are stored on backup servers located in
foreign countries, where they are fair game for bulk collection meant
85
to detect or counter terrorism.
This means that the NSA is free to leverage the global nature of
our communications networks to harvest communications that, in the
pre-digital era, would have been wholly domestic in character. A
former NSA chief analyst told the Washington Post in 2013 that the
NSA prefers to avoid legal restrictions on data collection whenever
possible. “Look, NSA has platoons of lawyers, and their entire job is
figuring out how to stay within the law and maximize collection by
exploiting every loophole,” the former analyst said. “It’s fair to say
the rules are less restrictive under Executive Order 12333 than they
86
In fact, scholars have identified how the NSA
are under FISA.”
could, if it so desired, deliberately use Internet network protocols to
route American domestic network traffic abroad in order to scoop it
up under EO 12333, thereby evading Fourth Amendment limitations
87
and FISA procedures. (Whether the NSA would actually use these
88
tactics is, of course, only a matter of speculation.)
Although EO 12333 specifically allows intelligence agencies to collect, retain, and disseminate data on U.S. persons as part of lawful
89
foreign intelligence operations, it also directs those agencies to “use
the least intrusive techniques feasible within the United States or di90
rected against United States persons abroad.” Accordingly, the NSA
must comply with AG-approved procedures for handling U.S. person

85

86
87
88

89
90

See PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GRP. ON INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES,
LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD 183 (Dec. 2013), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-12-12_rg_final_report.pdf [hereinafter PRG REPORT] (explaining that “[e]ven for a person in the US who never knowingly
sends communications abroad, there may be collection by US intelligence agencies outside of the US” under EO 12333); see also Gellman & Soltani, supra note 76, (explaining
how EO 12333 allows the NSA to intercept and collect vast numbers of communication
records from overseas data centers); Ellen Nakashima & Ashkan Soltani, Privacy Watchdog’s Next Target: the Least-Known but Biggest Aspect of NSA Surveillance, WASH. POST (July 23,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2014/07/23/privacywatchdogs-next-target-the-least-known-but-biggest-aspect-of-nsa-surveillance (describing
how Americans’ communications transit across national borders and are often stored
overseas).
Gellman & Soltani, supra note 76.
See Arnbak & Goldberg, supra note 82, at 343–56.
The NSA responded to this suggestion by noting that the NSA must procure a FISA warrant to target any U.S. person for electronic surveillance, except in certain limited situations. Id. at 339. As the article authors note, however, this answer fails to respond to
their concerns regarding untargeted, bulk network collection. Id. at 339–40.
EO 12333, supra note 13, at § 2.3(c).
Id. at § 2.4.
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information acquired under EO 12333. 91 Those procedures, however, are much more privacy protective with respect to communications
content as opposed to communications metadata. For example, NSA
personnel are directed to make “every reasonable effort, through surveys and technical means, to reduce to the maximum extent possible”
any incidental collection of the content of domestic communications
92
under EO 12333. While EO 12333 content-minimization requirements are not as stringent as those imposed on U.S. person communications collected incidentally or inadvertently under Section 702 of
93
FISA, they at least provide some privacy protections with respect to
the contents of incidentally acquired, domestic communications.
Communications metadata is another matter. Thanks to Edward
Snowden, we know that the NSA believes it has practically unlimited
ability to analyze and augment Americans’ communications metadata
gathered under EO 12333, and use it to create large-scale graphs of
Americans’ social connections. In September 2013, the New York
Times published internal NSA documents indicating that, beginning
in November 2010, the NSA changed its procedures to allow its analysts to contact chain EO 12333 metadata even when that metadata
contained American selectors such as phone numbers and email ad94
dresses. Prior to that date, the NSA required analysts to stop contact
91
92

93

94

Id. at § 2.3.
See Classified Annex, supra note 78, at § 3. For a summary of the minimization procedures that apply to communications content collected by the NSA under EO 12333, see
NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, LEGAL FACT SHEET: EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333, at 126 (2013),
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/eo12333/NSA/Legal%20Fact%20Sheet%20Executive
%20Order%2012333.pdf [hereinafter NSA Legal FACT SHEET].
For a thorough overview of surveillance conducted under Section 702 of the FISA
Amendments Act, including an explanation of targeting and minimization procedures,
see David Medine et al., PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE
SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT (2014), https://www.pclob.gov/library/702-Report.pdf
[hereinafter PCLOB SECTION 702 REPORT]. According to the PCLOB Section 702 Report, both communication content and metadata collected under Section 702 is considered to be a “communication,” and is therefore protected by minimization procedures.
Id. at 127 n.524.
The NSA’s 2014 Section 702 minimization procedures have been publicly released.
See Nat’l Sec. Agency/Cent. Sec. Serv., Exihibit B: Minimization Procedures used by the
National Security Agency in Connection with Acquisitions of Foreign Intelligence Information Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as
Amended (2007), http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ppd-28/2014%20NSA%20702%
20Minimization%20Procedures.pdf.
See James Risen & Laura Poitras, N.S.A. Gathers Data on Social Connections of U.S. Citizens,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2013 at A1, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/29/us/nsaexamines-social-networks-of-us-citizens.html?_r=0 (linking NSA Contact-Chaining Memo
and Example Social Network Graph, documents which have not been declassified or officially acknowledged by the government).
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chaining when they bumped up against an American phone number,
95
email address, or other metadata term. A NSA spokeswoman explained that the policy change reflected the Supreme Court’s 1979
96
holding in Smith v. Maryland , that Americans have no reasonable
expectation of privacy in, and hence no Fourth Amendment protec97
tion of, their phone records. The Times also revealed that the NSA
enriches EO 12333 metadata by combining it with material from public and commercial databases, GPS location information, Facebook
98
profiles, and other sources. Several days later, then-NSA Director
General Keith Alexander confirmed many of the article’s claims while
99
testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee.
The subsequently declassified NSA procedures described by the
Times were approved by Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey in
2008 and are set out in a document entitled “Special Procedures
100
Not
Governing Communications Metadata Analysis” (“SPCMA”).
101
fully implemented by the NSA until 2010, SPCMA authorizes the
agency to conduct contact chaining (and undefined “other” analysis)
on all EO 12333-collected communications metadata, limited only by
the caveat that such analysis be performed for “valid foreign intelli102
gence purposes.” SPCMA imposes no hop limits to cabin the NSA’s
ability to conduct social network analysis; rather, the NSA’s ability to
contact chain any EO 12333 telephony or email metadata appears to
be infinite:
95
96
97

98
99

100

101
102

Id.
442 U.S. 735 (1979). See infra notes 143–49 and accompanying text.
Risen & Poitras, supra note 94. The NSA’s legal rationale for changing its procedures to
allow contact chaining through American identifiers is set out in more detail in a topsecret memorandum that was leaked by Edward Snowden but has not been declassified or
officially acknowledged by the government. See Memorandum for the Att’y Gen., from
Kenneth L. Wainstein, Assistant Att’y Gen., Proposed Amendment to Dept. of Def. Procedures to Permit the Nat’l Sec. Agency to Conduct Analysis of Communications Metadata Associated with Persons in the United States 4–6 (Nov. 20, 2007), http://
www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/27/nsa-data-collection-justicedepartment [hereinafter Wainstein Memo].
Risen & Poitras, supra note 94.
Hearing on Continued Oversight of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2013), http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/continuedoversight-of-the-foreign-intelligence-surveillance-act (testimony of NSA Director Keith B.
Alexander).
NAT’L SEC. AGENCY/CENT. SEC. SERV., DEPT. OF DEFENSE SUPPLEMENTAL PROCEDURES
GOVERNING COMMUNICATIONS METADATA ANALYSIS (2008) [hereinafter SPCMA],
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/0909/DoD%20Supplemental%20Procedures%202
0080314.pdf.
See Risen & Poitras, supra note 94.
SPCMA, supra note 100, at § 3(a). SPCMA gives no indication what any other additional
analysis might be.
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Contact chaining . . . shows, for example, the telephone numbers or email addresses that a particular telephone number or e-mail address has
been in contact with, or has attempted to contact. Through this process,
computer algorithms automatically identify not only the first tier of contacts made by the seed telephone number or e-mail address, but also the
further contacts made by the first tier of telephone numbers or e-mail
103
addresses and so on.

By allowing the NSA to contact chain through American identifiers for an unlimited number of hops, SPCMA theoretically provides
the government with a means to acquire comprehensive databases of
domestic calls and email records. Nothing in the EO 12333 regime
requires the government to limit metadata searches to identifiers for
which it has a reasonable articulable suspicion of a link to terrorism;
again, a foreign intelligence purpose is enough. And unlike the
Freedom Act, which requires the NSA to purge telephony metadata
that is irrelevant to foreign intelligence, communications records obtained under EO 12333 may be retained in a government database
104
for at least five years.
With respect to dissemination of U.S. person information that the
NSA incidentally acquires under EO 12333, the agency applies the
same rules whether the information came from communications con105
tent or metadata. However, any privacy protections for U.S. person
data contained in the AG-approved procedures implementing EO
12333 do not apply to searches of communications metadata obtained under that order. This is because privacy protections provided
by those documents only apply to information that is “collected” under the government’s own definition. Understanding how this works
requires tracking a convoluted series of definitions contained in various policy directives.

103

104

105

Id. at § 2(b); see also SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE (“SID”) MANAGEMENT
DIRECTIVE NO. 424, SIGINT DEVELOPMENT—COMMUNICATIONS METADATA ANALYSIS 3
(2010),
https://epic.org/privacy/surveillance/12333/20150312-NSA-production.pdf
(exhibit to letter) (stating that for a valid foreign intelligence purpose, communications
metadata obtained under EO 12333 may be subject to “complete contact chain analysis”).
See NAT. SEC. AGENCY, ET AL., UNITED STATES SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE SP0018, §
6 (2011) [hereinafter USSID 18], http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/1118/CLEANED
Final%20USSID%20SP0018.pdf. See also Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2015, Pub. L. No. 113-293, 128 Stat. 3990 (2014), § 309 (requiring intelligence agencies
to limit retention to five years of nonpublic telephone or electronic communications to
or from a U.S. person that were obtained without a court order, with certain exceptions,
including for communications with foreign intelligence value).
See NSA LEGAL FACT SHEET, supra note 92, at 126 (summarizing dissemination standards
and explaining that they are the same for metadata and communication content of or
concerning U.S. persons).
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First, Department of Defense (“DoD”) Directive 5240.1-R, which
sets out procedures regarding intelligence activities affecting U.S.
persons, provides that data acquired electronically is not “collected”
until it has been received for use by an intelligence agency and “pro106
While the meaning of “intelligible
cessed into intelligible form.”
form” is not defined, a further NSA directive explains that information is not “collected” until an NSA analyst intentionally “task[s]
or selects” a communication for “subsequent processing aimed at re107
Finally, SPCMA amended
porting or retention as a file record.”
DoD Directive 5240.1-R to “clarify” that “contact chaining and other
metadata analysis do not qualify as ‘interception’ or ‘selection’ of
108
In this way, the intelligence community has recommunications.”
defined “collection” to exclude electronic gathering and analysis of
communications metadata from otherwise applicable minimization
109
procedures. Remember that these policies and procedures are developed and applied solely within the executive branch without FISC
approval, and that Congress has not chosen to subject NSA activities
110
under EO 12333 to significant oversight.
From this discussion, it should be clear why EO 12333 has been
described as a legal loophole that allows the NSA to take advantage of
our global communications network to justify warrantless surveillance
111
In a 2014 Washington Post op-ed piece, former State
of Americans.
Department official-turned-whistleblower, John Napier Tye, tried to
warn Americans about the massive scope of NSA surveillance under
EO 12333, suggesting that the former Section 215 telephony metada106
107
108
109

110

111

U.S. DEP’T OF DEF. DIRECTIVE 5240.1-R, PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF DOD
INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS THAT AFFECT UNITED STATES PERSONS, § C2.2.1 (1982).
USSID 18, supra note 104, at § 9.2.
SPCMA, supra note 100, at § 4.
For helpful analysis and explanation regarding these definitions and their implications,
see Faiza Patel, How the Second Circuit’s Decision in Clapper Informs the Section 215 Discussion,
JUST SECURITY (May 11, 2015), http://justsecurity.org/22944/clapper-section-215discussion/; Did the Second Circuit Decision ALSO Blow Up SPCMA?, EMPTYWHEEL (May 11,
2015),
https://www.emptywheel.net/2015/05/11/did-the-second-circuit-decision-alsoblow-up-spcma/.
According to the Wainstein Memo, the NSA briefed the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence regarding SPCMA
sometime prior to Nov. 20, 2007. See Wainstein Memo, supra note 97, at 3.
See John Napier Tye, Meet Executive Order 12333: The Reagan Rule that Lets the NSA Spy on
Americans, WASH. POST (July 18, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/meetexecutive-order-12333-the-reagan-rule-that-lets-the-nsa-spy-on-americans/2014/07/18/
93d2ac22-0b93-11e4-b8e5-d0de80767fc2_story.html (arguing that EO 12333 contains a
legal loophole that allows for U.S. persons’ communications “incidentally” collected to be
retained, despite the fact that EO 12333 prohibits U.S. persons from being targeted without a court order).
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ta program was merely “a mechanism to backfill that portion of U.S.
112
Tye
person data that cannot be collected overseas under 12333.”
also hinted that the NSA still stockpiles U.S person email and other
Internet metadata under EO 12333, despite assurances by General
Alexander that the FISC-approved program under the pen register/trap and trace provisions of the Patriot Act discussed earlier had
been discontinued in 2011 to “better protect civil liberties and priva113
cy.” Although the Freedom Act forbids the NSA from using the Patriot Act provisions to restart this program in bulk, again, the new law
114
has no effect on the NSA’s activities under EO 12333.
To recap, many Americans were outraged to learn in 2013 that
the NSA, with FISC approval, was collecting and analyzing their call
detail records without their knowledge or consent under the former
Section 215 of the Patriot Act. After two years of debate, Congress
imposed some additional limits on the government’s ability to collect
and scrutinize our telephone or email metadata by enacting the
Freedom Act. Some believe these changes are significant; others
have been more critical. Congressional reforms to FISA and the Patriot Act, however, are futile if the government can simply continue
to gather and analyze our communications metadata as before via an
alternate path. Under EO 12333, the NSA can vacuum up domestic
communications metadata in bulk as long as the capture occurs from
a foreign source or the communications involve one communicant in
a foreign country. The NSA is then free to augment that metadata
with other information and map the social connections of American
citizens, out to an unlimited number of hops, for foreign intelligence
purposes. The NSA claims these actions are compatible with the
Fourth Amendment because Americans have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their communications metadata. In the next Part, I
focus on how communications privacy developed under the Fourth
112

113
114

Id. Edward Snowden has described EO 12333 as “what the NSA uses when the other [legal] authorities aren’t aggressive enough or aren’t catching as much [data] as they’d
like.” Chris Morran, John Oliver Gets Edward Snowden to Explain Government Snooping in
Terms of Penis Photos, CONSUMERIST (Apr. 6, 2015), http://consumerist.com/2015/04/
06/john-oliver-gets-edward-snowden-to-explain-government-snooping-in-terms-of-penisphotos/.
Tye, supra note 111 (noting that Alexander said only that the NSA stopped collecting this
data under the Patriot Act, not that it did not collect the data at all).
The NSA admitted as much in November 2015, when it released an inspector general’s
report confirming that the Patriot Act email dragnet had been shut down in part because
the same domestic Internet metadata could be collected abroad under EO 12333 and analyzed pursuant to SPCMA. See Charlie Savage, File Says N.S.A. Found Way to Replace Email
Program, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/20/us/politics/
records-show-email-analysis-continued-after-nsa-program-ended.html?_r=0.
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Amendment, rather than the First, and consider whether Smith v.
115
Maryland justifies the NSA’s almost-unlimited ability to collect and
analyze domestic communications metadata under EO 12333.
II. COMMUNICATIONS METADATA AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Following the Snowden revelations, former President Jimmy
Carter famously remarked that he assumes the NSA monitors his
electronic communications; accordingly, when he desires to correspond privately with foreign leaders, he writes a letter and posts it in
116
Assuming President Carter seeks to shield only the
the U.S. mail.
contents of his snail mail, his approach is sound: the Supreme Court
first recognized a right to communications privacy in the context of
sealed letters. However, the names and addresses of the former president’s correspondents, as well as postmarks or other envelope notations—in effect, the communications metadata associated with those
letters—can, and well may, be collected by the government without
117
In this
triggering the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.
Part, I trace how the Court grounded communications privacy in the
Fourth Amendment, rather than the First, and how it developed the
third party doctrine in the context of telephone call detail records.
Although this is well-travelled territory, I set out these familiar precedents to show how they form the basis for the government’s constitutional argument justifying today’s bulk metadata surveillance programs.
A. Mail Privacy and the Fourth Amendment Path
Somewhat surprisingly, the protection of communications privacy
in America originated not from judicial interpretations of the Consti118
At least in part in retution, but rather from early postal policies.
115
116

117

118

442 U.S. 735 (1979).
David Jackson, Carter Uses Snail Mail to Evade NSA, USA TODAY (Mar. 24, 2014),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/theoval/2014/03/24/obama-jimmy-carter-nationalsecurity-agency-surveillance-snail-mail/6818605/.
In July 2013, The New York Times revealed the existence of the Mail Isolation Control and
Tracking program, under which U.S. Postal Service computers photograph the outside of
every piece of mail processed in the United States, thereby providing the government
with a record of mail metadata. See Ron Nixon, U.S. Postal Service Logging All Mail for Law
Enforcement, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/04/us/monitoring-of-snail-mail.html.
See Anuj C. Desai, Wiretapping Before the Wires: The Post Office and the Birth of Communications
Privacy, 60 STAN. L. REV. 553, 557 (2007) (“[A]s a historical matter, it was the post office—
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sponse to a history of British postal surveillance, 119 Congress in 1792
enacted the Postal Service Act, which made it a crime for postal offi120
This
cials to open sealed letters unless they were undeliverable.
121
early postal policy, still reflected in the law today, created public
confidence in the sanctity of the mails as well as a public expectation
regarding communications privacy, and helped build what Professor
122
Jack Balkin has termed an “infrastructure of free expression” in the
new country.
The Supreme Court first considered a claim of communications
123
privacy in Ex parte Jackson, an 1878 case where the petitioner relied
on the First Amendment to challenge his conviction under a federal
law prohibiting all lottery advertisements, even those for legal lotteries, from the mail. Petitioner’s counsel argued that the law constituted content-based censorship, which, if allowed, would empower Congress to exclude from the mail communications on any topic it found
124
Justice Stephen Field, writing for a unanimous
objectionable.
Court, upheld the constitutionality of the statute as a valid exercise of
Congress’s power to prohibit materials that “have a demoralizing in125
fluence upon the people” from the mails; he did not directly ad126
dress the petitioner’s specific First Amendment claim. Rather, Justice Field, in dicta, located privacy protection for letters and sealed
packages in the Fourth Amendment, drawing a distinction between
“what is intended to be kept free from inspection, such as letters, and
sealed packages subject to letter postage; and what is open to inspection, such as newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, and other printed
127
matter, purposely left in a condition to be examined.”
Hence, sealed, first-class letters deposited in the U.S. mail for delivery became the sender’s papers for the purposes of the Fourth

119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126

127

not the Fourth Amendment of its own independent force—that originally gave us the notion of communications privacy that we now view as an abstract constitutional principle
applicable to telephone conversations, e-mails, and the like.”).
Id. at 560–65.
Act of Feb. 20, 1792, §§ 16, 18, 1 Stat. 232, 236–37.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1703 (2000) (outlining the misdemeanor offense for a Postal Service officer or employee who unlawfully destroys, delays, or opens mail).
Jack M. Balkin, The First Amendment is an Information Policy, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 3–4
(2012).
96 U.S. 727 (1877).
Id. at 730–31.
Id. at 736.
Justice Field did, however, recognize that mail regulations excluding certain publications
from the mail could deliver a “fatal blow” to the First Amendment’s guarantee of a free
press. Id. at 733, 735.
Id. at 733.
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Amendment; their contents (as opposed to “what is open to inspection,” such as any envelope notations that could be viewed by all)
were not subject to inspection in transit without a warrant. Although
the Court could have upheld the statute on First Amendment
grounds pursuant to the bad tendency test then used to evaluate
128
speech restrictions, the Court declined to do so. Today, the statute
most certainly would be invalid as an unconstitutional restriction of
commercial speech, but in 1878, First Amendment protection for ad129
Rather, in an example
vertising was almost a hundred years away.
130
of path dependency, Ex parte Jackson situated the Court’s communications privacy analysis in the Fourth Amendment, where it has remained.
B. Electronic Eavesdropping and False Friends
The advent of electronic communications posed two related questions for the Court: are conversations—spoken words—covered by
the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable search and
seizure; and, if so, may the government use electronic means to intercept those words? By the mid-twentieth century, the Court had established that oral statements, as well as papers and effects, fall within
131
Fourth Amendment protections. With respect to government wiretapping, the Court in the landmark 1967 case of Katz v. United States
drew a distinction between what a person “knowingly exposes to the
public” and what he or she “seeks to preserve as private, even in an
area accessible to the public,” holding that the Fourth Amendment
128

129
130

131

The Court remarked that the statute merely prohibited “corrupting publications and articles” about lotteries—”institutions which are supposed to have a demoralizing influence
upon the people.” Id. at 736. Regarding the “bad tendency” test, see DAVID M. RABBAN,
FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 132 (1997) (“The most pervasive and fundamental
judicial approach to free speech issues between the Civil War and World War I used the
bad tendency test derived from Sir William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the English
common law in the eighteenth century.”).
See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976);
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
By this I mean simply that precedent in a particular area of law may then require, steer,
or prohibit the direction of certain choices by the Court in future decisions. See Michael
J. Gerhardt, The Limited Path Dependency of Precedent, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 903, 905 (2005)
(exploring the two prevailing views of precedent in scholarly literature, including path
dependency).
Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 301 (1966) (citing Silverman v. United States, 365
U.S. 505 (1961) (explaining “the protections of the Fourth Amendment are surely not
limited to tangibles, but can extend as well to oral statements”)); Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1963) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961)
(holding “that the Fourth Amendment may protect against the overhearing of verbal
statements as well as against the more traditional seizure of ‘papers and effects’”)).
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only protects the latter. 132 The defendant, accordingly, was entitled to
exclude the “uninvited ear” of the government from his phone con133
versations even though they occurred in a public phone booth. Because the government had failed to obtain a warrant, its conduct did
134
not comport with the Fourth Amendment.
The real take-away from Katz, however, came from Justice John
Marshall Harlan II’s concurrence where he articulated the iconic twopart reasonable expectation of privacy test: to show that the government conducted an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, an individual must have “an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy” and that expectation of privacy must be one “that so135
Within a year, the
ciety is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”
Court had adopted Justice Harlan’s test as the controlling principle
136
137
from Katz, and, critical commentary notwithstanding, courts have
applied it ever since. As applied by the Court in later cases, Justice
Harlan’s reasonable expectation of privacy test turned into a balancing of interests approach where judges consider all the circumstances
138
surrounding a search to determine its reasonableness.
During these same years, the Court also addressed questions of
communications privacy in the context of criminal suspects who revealed incriminating information to government agents or informants. In these false friend cases, the Court relied on an assumption of
132
133
134
135
136

137

138

389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
Id. at 352.
Id. at 358–59.
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (“We have recently held that ‘the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,’ Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967), and
wherever an individual may harbor a reasonable ‘expectation of privacy,’ id., at 361 (Mr.
Justice Harlan, concurring), he is entitled to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.”); see also United States v, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012) (“Our later cases have
applied the analysis of Justice Harlan’s concurrence in [Katz], which said that a violation
occurs when government officers violate a person’s ‘reasonable expectation of privacy.’”).
The reasonable expectation of privacy test has been roundly criticized for its unpredictable and inconsistent results, as well as for its subjectivity and circularity. See, e.g., Richard
A. Posner, The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 173,
188 (1979) (describing the Katz test as “circular” because an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy will always depend upon “what the legal rule is”); Daniel J. Solove,
Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511, 1511 (2010) (criticizing the Katz test
as having “led to a contentious jurisprudence that is riddled with inconsistency and incoherence”).
See, e.g., Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996) (stating that Fourth Amendment reasonableness “is measured in objective terms by examining the totality of the circumstances”); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (concluding that the legality of a warrantless search of a public school student “should depend simply on the reasonableness,
under all the circumstances, of the search”).
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the risk theory to hold that when a suspect exchanges information
with a confederate, the suspect has no reasonable expectation that
139
According to the Court, it
the information will remain private.
would be unreasonable for the suspect in that situation to believe either that (1) the confederate will not share the information with law
enforcement in the future; or (2) the confederate is not already
working for the government, and may be recording or transmitting
140
the conversation as it occurs.
C. Communications Metadata and the Third Party Doctrine
Having developed the assumption of the risk theory in the false
friend cases, the Court next applied it to establish that individuals
have no reasonable expectation of privacy in information they share
141
with a third-party service provider. In United States v. Miller, the
Court cited the false friend cases to hold that a bank depositor assumes the risk that the bank will provide her financial records to the
government in response to a subpoena duces tecum, even though the
depositor may have believed the bank would keep the records confi142
Whereas Miller dealt with financial records, the Court in
dential.
143
Smith v. Maryland applied the assumption of the risk rationale to
what today we would call communications metadata—in this case,
records of phone numbers dialed by a criminal suspect and held by
the telephone company. There, at law enforcement request, a local
phone company placed a pen register on a robbery suspect’s phone
line after the victim reported receiving threatening calls from a man
144
When the device revealed
who identified himself as her assailant.
that, on the very day it was installed, the suspect called the victim’s
139

140
141
142

143
144

See, e.g., Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (explaining “[n]either this Court
nor any member of it has ever expressed the view that the Fourth Amendment protects a
wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it”); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966) (holding the
Fourth Amendment is not violated when a “home is converted into a commercial center
. . . for purposes of transacting unlawful business” and a government agent enters with an
invitation to do business).
See, e.g., Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302 (noting that by speaking in front of an informant, the defendant had mistakenly relied on the loyalty of someone he mistook for a friend).
425 U.S. 435 (1976).
Id. at 443. (“This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be
used only for a limited purpose and the confidence place in the third party will not be betrayed.”).
442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979).
Id. at 737.
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home number, police obtained a warrant to search the suspect’s
145
house. At trial, the suspect relied on Katz to argue that all evidence
derived from the pen register had been obtained in violation of his
146
Fourth Amendment rights.
The Court disagreed, holding that the placement of a pen register
on a telephone phone line did not qualify as a Fourth Amendment
147
The Court emphasized the pen register’s limited ability to
search.
reveal only numbers dialed from a particular phone, not whether a
148
Given that all
call was completed or what was said by either party.
subscribers know that the phone company keeps records of their calls
for billing and other purposes, the Court found it implausible that
phone customers could have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
149
those records.
Dissenting, Justice Potter Stewart argued that the call logs did, in
fact, contain substantive information. Few telephone customers
would consent to have a list of their phone calls made public, Justice
Stewart observed, not because the numbers would reveal criminal
conduct, but because they “easily could reveal the identities of the
persons and the places called, and thus reveal the most intimate de150
In a separate dissent, Justice Thurgood
tails of a person’s life.”
Marshall distinguished the false friend cases as situations where the
defendants had chosen whether, and to whom, to confide their secrets; the defendant in Smith had no choice but to assume the risk of
151
Justice
government surveillance to be able to use his telephone.
Marshall recognized that warrantless use of pen registers implicates
both Fourth and First Amendment values, noting in particular how
government monitoring of call records could chill both political as152
sociation and freedom of the press.
Almost from the day it was decided, Smith has been harshly criticized, both as misapprehending the expectations of privacy that people attach to personal records they must, of necessity, deposit with

145
146
147
148
149

150
151
152

Id.
Id. at 737–38.
Id. at 745–46.
Id. at 741–42.
Id. at 742–43. It should be noted that the Smith holding turned on the Court’s evaluation
of whether someone who, having revealed his phone calls to the phone company, could
reasonably expect those records to be held in confidence—not merely that government
capture of non-content information is not a search.
Id. at 748 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Id. at 749–50 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 751.
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third parties, 153 and for giving the government an untoward ability to
154
monitor its citizens. Although Smith raises serious privacy concerns,
the scope of the surveillance upheld in Smith was both more targeted
and much narrower in scope than bulk metadata collection and anal155
In Smith, a simple device was
ysis conducted under EO 12333.
placed on the phone line of one specific, named individual whom police had good reason to suspect. Although the NSA will not reveal
the volume of incidental collection of U.S. persons’ communications
156
metadata collected under EO 12333, intelligence officials have indicated that the former Section 215 program was diminutive in com157
parison. Given that bulk collection is, by definition, untargeted, it
153

154

155

156

157

See, e.g., Gerald G. Ashdown, The Fourth Amendment and the “Legitimate Expectation of Privacy,” 34 VAND. L. REV. 1289, 1314–15 (1981) (describing the Court’s analysis in Smith as
“misguided”); Clifford S. Fishman, Pen Registers and Privacy: Risks, Expectations, and the Nullification of Congressional Intent, 29 CATH. U. L. REV. 557, 567–74 (1980) (criticizing the
Court’s factual assumptions and legal analysis in Smith); Susan Freiwald, Online Surveillance: Remembering the Lessons of the Wiretap Act, 56 ALA. L. REV. 9, 40, 66 (2004) (faulting
the Court in Smith for failing to consider how much privacy the law should grant to information that most individuals would consider to be private); Anita Ramasastry, Lost in
Translation? Data Mining, National Security and the “Adverse Inference” Problem, 22 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L. J. 757, 764 (2006) (disputing that individuals give up
their expectation of privacy in information they provide to third parties in the course of
modern life).
Congress responded to Smith by enacting the Pen Register Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508,
100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–27 (2012)), which requires the government to procure a court order before installing a pen register. This is
easier for the government to obtain than a traditional warrant; it need only certify that
the use of the pen register is “relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation.” 18 U.S.C. §
3123(a).
See, e.g., Jack Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1, 19
(2008) (citing Smith as an example of how the Court has “debilitated the Fourth Amendment” as a tool to prevent government abuse of power); Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth
Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1254–56 (1983)
(arguing that in Smith, the Court gave the government too much power to collect phone
records of those who are not guilty or even suspected of criminal activity).
The scope of the surveillance upheld in Smith was also much narrower than that conducted by the NSA under the former Section 215 telephony metadata collection program.
See, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitutional Concerns,
37 HARV. J.L. & POL’Y, 757, 869–71 (2014) (distinguishing telephony metadata collection
program from pen register installation in Smith); PCLOB Section 215 Report, supra note
7, at 114 (stating that Smith “does not provide a good fit” for the Section 215 telephony
metadata collection program).
See Gellman & Soltani, supra note 81 (quoting intelligence officials saying that it would be
“awkward” or impossible to calculate the number of American cell phones tracked overseas by the NSA).
See generally supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text. Former State Department official
John Napier Tye has stated that the NSA collects “a huge amount of Americans’ communications and data” under EO 12333. Timothy B. Lee, Why the Latest Patriot Act Reform
Won’t Be Enough To Rein in the NSA, VOX (June 8, 2015, 2:12 PM),
http://www.vox.com/2015/6/7/8741095/patriot-nsa-john-tye.
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stands to reason that it would include communication records belonging to many U.S. persons who have no connection to terrorism.
Police monitored the Smith defendant’s phone for no more than two
days to see whether he dialed only one specific phone number (the
158
The NSA has been collecting telephony and email
victim’s).
metadata associated with U.S. persons under EO 12333 at least since
159
160
2007 (and probably long before).
The pen register information provided in Smith was also less revealing than bulk metadata collection under EO 12333—the pen register recorded only the numbers dialed from one suspect’s phone.
Call records collected and analyzed by the NSA under EO 12333 include not only the telephone numbers of calls dialed, but also of
161
those received, as well as the date, time, and duration of the call.
Email metadata includes information that appears on the “to,”
“from,” “cc,” and “bcc” (although not the “subject”) lines, plus the Internet-protocol (IP) address of the computer from which an email
was sent, IP address of routers and servers that handled the email
transmission, plus login and inbox information if a user accesses a
162
web-based email account. As described in Part I, the NSA relies on
the third party doctrine to justify performing contact chaining on
communications metadata acquired under EO 12333, obtaining an
unlimited number of hops worth of additional records as long as its
investigation serves a valid foreign intelligence purpose and keeping
163
those records for at least five years.
Not only is this information much richer than that disclosed by
the pen register in Smith, the communications metadata we generate
every day are also more voluminous than anything a time traveler
from the 1970s could possibly imagine. We rely today on various
forms of electronic communications to handle everyday tasks and
connect with almost anyone, anywhere, at any time in a way that was
inconceivable in 1979. At the same time, the investigative tools used
158
159

160

161
162
163

442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979).
See Office of General Counsel, Memorandum for the Deputy Chief of Staff, Sharing of
“Raw SIGINT” Through Database Access 4–5 (July 12, 2007) (referring to NSA collection
of bulk telephony metadata containing numbers with U.S. area codes, and describing difficulty determining whether email metadata were foreign or domestic).
The Drug Enforcement Agency admitted that it used administrative subpoenas to collect
telephony records of billions of Americans’ calls to foreign countries beginning back in
1992. See Brad Heath, U.S. Secretly Tracked Billions of Calls for Decades, USA TODAY (Apr. 8,
2015),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/04/07/dea-bulk-telephonesurveillance-operation/70808616/.
See SPCMA, supra note 100, at § 2.
Id.
See supra notes 94–104 and accompanying text.
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today by the government to aggregate, track, and analyze communications metadata are markedly more sophisticated than anything
available during the Smith era.
D. The Future of the Third Party Doctrine
Critics of the third party doctrine found reason to hope for its
164
demise based on the recent case of United States v. Jones, where five
members of the Court demonstrated a heightened sensitivity to the
privacy implications of new technology. The Jones Court unanimously
held that the government must obtain a warrant to attach a global
positioning system device to a car to track its movements for twenty165
eight days. The government had argued that the defendant had no
reasonable expectation of privacy while driving a car on the public
166
roads, where he could be seen by all. Justice Antonin Scalia, writing
for the majority, rejected this approach, concluding that the government had conducted a Fourth Amendment search by intruding onto,
167
and physically occupying, private property to obtain information.
In a concurrence joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Elena Kagan, Justice Samuel Alito applied the Katz
formula to conclude that long-term monitoring facilitated by new
technology violated the defendant’s reasonable expectations of priva168
Justice Alito noted that modern technology has given law ency.
forcement the ability to engage in constant, pervasive monitoring
that would have been logistically impossible as well as cost-prohibitive
169
Although he called on legislatures to limit
in the pre-digital age.
law enforcement use of tracking technology, in the absence of statutory guidelines, Justice Alito concluded that the lengthy monitoring
170
“For [most] offenses,” he
here violated the Fourth Amendment.
wrote, “society’s expectation has been that law enforcement agents
and others would not—and indeed, in the main, simply could not—
secretly monitor and catalogue every single movement of an individ171
ual’s car for a very long period.”
In a separate concurrence, Justice Sonia Sotomayor addressed the
third party issue head on, and called for its reconsideration in light of
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171

132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
Id. at 947–49.
Id. at 950.
Id. at 949.
Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 963–64.
Id. at 964.
Id.
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modern technology. 172 Describing the doctrine as “ill suited to the
digital age,” she noted that people today have no choice but to reveal
information about themselves in the course of completing their daily
173
tasks. She also recognized the importance of First Amendment values in the Fourth Amendment calculation, noting that government
174
monitoring has a chilling effect on speech and association. Accordingly, Justice Sotomayor said she was unwilling to “assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a
limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth
175
Amendment protection.”
Of course, Jones did not involve communications metadata and,
strictly speaking, left the Smith holding unchanged. Nevertheless,
taken together, the concurring opinions in Jones show that at least five
Justices have misgivings about intrusive government surveillance
made possible by modern technology. Justice Alito noted a particular
concern with the ability of wireless carriers to track, record, and ag176
gregate the location of cell phone users, a type of metadata that has
177
been collected by the NSA in the past. In another recent case, Riley
178
v. California, the Court unanimously held that police must obtain a
warrant before searching data on an arrestee’s cell phone. In his
opinion for the Court, Chief Justice John Roberts noted the privacy
interests associated with digital devices, observing that cell phones
can store much more private information than a person typically
would carry in a handbag or wallet. 179 The Chief Justice also focused
on cell phone location data, citing Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence
in Jones for the proposition that historic location data can be used to
reconstruct a person’s minute-by-minute movements, both outside
and indoors. 180
Although these two cases may herald a willingness by the Court to
adapt the Fourth Amendment to the digital age, Smith has yet to be

172
173
174
175
176
177

178
179
180

Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 956.
Id. at 957.
Id. at 963–64 (Alito, J., concurring).
See Charlie Savage, In Test Project, N.S.A. Tracked Cellphone Locations, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 2,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/03/us/nsa-experiment-traced-us-cellphonelocations.html.
134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014).
Id. at 2488–89.
Id. at 2490.
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overruled. 181 Indeed, Smith remains the major precedent on which
both the government and courts consistently have relied to justify or
uphold the bulk collection of communications metadata. Before the
passage of the Freedom Act, a handful of challengers contested the
constitutionality of the former Section 215 telephony metadata program in court, but only one district court judge suggested that it likely violated the Fourth Amendment—a holding later reversed on
182
The other courts that
standing grounds by the D.C. Circuit.
reached the constitutional question applied Smith to hold that phone
subscribers have no reasonable expectation of privacy in call detail
183
records shared with their telecommunications providers.
The FISC, as well, has repeatedly invoked Smith and the third party doctrine to reauthorize telephony metadata collection under the
184
For example, in a post-Jones decision, FISC
former Section 215.
Judge Eagan cited Smith (with no mention of Jones) to approve the
program, despite its bulk nature. “[W]here one individual does not
have a Fourth Amendment interest,” she wrote, “grouping together a
large number of similarly-situated individuals cannot result in a
185
Fourth Amendment interest springing into existence ex nihilo.”
More recently, the FISC again applied Smith to deny a constitutional
challenge to the Freedom Act’s 180-day extension of the former Section 215 program, stating that with regard to the nature of the data
181

182

183

184

185

In Riley, Chief Justice Roberts warned in a footnote not to read too much into a decision
that did not address “whether the collection or inspection of aggregated digital information amounts to a search under other circumstances.” Id. at 2489–90 n.1.
See Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 32–42 (D.D.C. 2013), rev’d, 800 F.3d 559 (D.C.
Cir. 2015) (distinguishing Smith to find that citizens have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their telephony metadata, and enjoining the NSA telephony metadata collection
program as a likely violation of the Fourth Amendment).
In 2015, the Second Circuit held that the NSA telephony metadata collection program revealed by Edward Snowden exceeded the statutory authority provided to the government under the former Section 215 of the Patriot Act. ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F. 3d
787 (2d Cir. 2015). While the court did not reach the challengers’ Fourth Amendment
claims, it described those constitutional claims as both “vexing,” id. at 821, and “daunting,” id. at 825.
See Smith v. Obama, 24 F. Supp. 3d 1005, 1007 (D. Idaho 2014); ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F.
Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), rev’d on other grounds, 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015); United
States v. Moalin, No. 10cr4246 JM, 2013 WL 6079518 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2013).
See Opinion and Order, In Re Appl. of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order
Requiring the Production of Tangible Things (No. BR 15-75) and In Re Motion in Opp’n
to Government’s Request to Resume Bulk Data Collection Under Patriot Act Section 215
(No. 15-01), at 12-13 (FISA Ct. June 29, 2015), http://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/sites/
default/files/BR%2015-75%20Misc%2015-01%20Opinion%20and%20Order.pdf [hereinafter Mosman opinion] (listing FISC opinions upholding telephony metadata program
under Fourth Amendment).
Eagan opinion, supra note 25, at 9.
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acquired, the NSA’s bulk collection of Americans’ call detail records
is “indistinguishable” from the pen register information gathered in
186
the 1979 case.
While one can disagree with the FISC’s conclusions, at least government surveillance programs authorized under FISA are subject to
some type of court approval. No similar opportunity for FISC review
exists with respect to surveillance conducted under EO 12333. Individual Fourth Amendment challenges to EO 12333 bulk metadata
collection are highly unlikely to be heard in court at all, given that,
absent another Edward Snowden, a litigant will be hard-pressed to
demonstrate that his or her communications metadata have been
187
gathered or analyzed under the top-secret program. Still, the constitutional validity of the third party doctrine remains critical because—as discussed in Part I—the NSA relies on Smith to justify not
only bulk collections, but also limitless contact chaining of communications metadata that the agency knows belong to or are associated
188
with U.S. persons.
If, thanks to Smith, the Fourth Amendment fails adequately to protect the privacy of our communications metadata, can we avoid the
third party doctrine altogether by looking to the First Amendment
for relief? The next Part examines why, despite the free speech implications of communications privacy, First Amendment challenges to
bulk communications metadata collection programs are even more
likely to fail than those based on the Fourth.
III. COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
If the privacy interests of ordinary, law-abiding Americans in their
communications records are inadequately protected from incidental
189
collection by the Fourth Amendment thanks to Smith v. Maryland
190
and the third party doctrine, can a case be made that bulk collection of communications metadata by the government violates the
First Amendment? After all, our ability to contact whomever we
186
187

188
189
190

Mosman opinion, supra note 184, at 19.
Standing doctrine provides that litigants cannot bring constitutional challenges without
demonstrating that they have suffered an injury that is “concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable
ruling.” Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2752 (2010) (citing
Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 445 (2009)). See infra notes 280–98 and accompanying
text.
See supra notes 94–104 and accompanying text.
442 U.S. 735 (1979).
See supra text accompanying notes 141–86.
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please (including family and friends who live abroad) without concurrently notifying Big Brother would seem to be part of our freedom
of speech that the government may not abridge. People use email
and the telephone to arrange meetings and make plans; to order and
inquire about products and services; to ask, answer, and discuss questions regarding personal, political, religious, and professional matters; to seek and offer information and advice; and to share news,
thoughts, feelings, opinions, and beliefs with others. If communications metadata is so revealing that the NSA, under EO 12333, taps Internet cables to collect it in hopes of someday identifying possible
terrorists and their accomplices, must that metadata not also be revealing enough to implicate the First Amendment?
Scholars have often called for recognition of a First Amendment
right to object to government surveillance. Professor Jack Balkin, for
example, has warned of the threat to free speech posed by what he
calls “new school censorship”—when the government inserts backdoors and surveillance technologies into privately owned communication networks, which then provide the government with the ability
191
Professor Neil Richards has argued that
to access our digital lives.
government surveillance poses a threat to First Amendment freedom
of thought and private consultation that make up our right to “intel192
More generally, Professor Daniel Solove has prolectual privacy.”
posed that the First Amendment be recognized as an independent
source of criminal procedural protections beyond those afforded by
the Fourth Amendment. In particular, he has called for courts to
fashion a First Amendment right against intrusive government information-gathering programs that implicate expressive or associational
activities and are not narrowly tailored to achieve a substantial gov193
ernment interest.
Taking yet another tack, Matthew Lynch has suggested that, in the
surveillance context, a speaker’s choice of audience should be considered a form of speech that warrants First Amendment protection
194
from government interference. Even our former-constitutional-lawprofessor President has conceded the connection between government surveillance and free expression. When asked in December
191
192
193
194

Balkin, supra note 122, at 127–30 (warning against government insertion of backdoors
into privately owned communication networks).
Richards, supra note 23, at 1935–36.
Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 112, 159–60
(2007).
Matthew Lynch, Closing the Orwellian Loophole: The Present Constitutionality of Big Brother and
the Potential for a First Amendment Cure, 5 FIRST. AMEND. L. REV. 234, 298–300 (2007).
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2013 about the NSA surveillance programs, President Obama
acknowledged the importance of communications privacy as a component part of “our First Amendment rights and expectations in this
195
country.”
The Supreme Court has also recognized that laws protecting conversational privacy advance an important First Amendment interest in
196
facilitating private speech. In Bartnicki v. Vopper, the Court held
that media outlets that publicly disseminated the contents of an illegally intercepted cell phone call could not be punished under federal
or state eavesdropping statutes given that (1) those outlets had not
participated in the illegal interception; and (2) the call pertained to a
197
matter of public concern. Although six Justices concluded that the
media’s First Amendment right to broadcast newsworthy information
outweighed the speakers’ right to privacy in this instance, all nine Justices recognized the symbiotic relationship between conversational
privacy and the willingness of individuals to engage in constitutionally
198
Both the majority and the dissent emphasized
protected speech.
that actual surveillance need not take place to chill private speech;
the mere possibility that one’s conversations may be monitored can
199
Bartnicki indicates that
have a significant speech-inhibiting effect.
195

196
197
198

199

HARDBALL (NBC television broadcast Dec. 5, 2013) (transcript available at
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/53755285/ns/msnbc-hardball_with_chris_matthews/t/
hardball-chris-matthews-thursday-december-th/#.VIRgfDHF98E).
532 U.S. 514 (2001).
Id. at 534–35.
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens described the case as presenting “a conflict between interests of the highest order—on the one hand, the interest in full and free dissemination of information concerning public issues, and, on the other hand, the interest
in individual privacy and, more specifically, in fostering private speech.” Id. at 518. Justice Breyer, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice O’Connor, described the competing interests at stake as “media freedom” on one side and “personal, speech-related privacy” on the other. Id. at 538 (Breyer, J., concurring).
The dissenting Justices, led by Chief Justice Rehnquist, would have given even more
weight to the First Amendment rights of cell-phone-using Americans to keep their communications private. The Chief Justice reproached the majority for overemphasizing the
First Amendment rights of the media while jeopardizing those of ordinary citizens. Id. at
542 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Noting that, in 2001, approximately 49 million cellular
telephones were in use, the Chief Justice concluded that “the chilling effect of the Court’s
decision upon these private conversations will surely be great.” Id. at 554 (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting).
The majority and dissent both quoted with approval the following paragraph from the
President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice:
In a democratic society, privacy of communication is essential if citizens are to
think and act creatively and constructively. Fear or suspicion that one’s speech is
being monitored by a stranger, even without the reality of such activity, can have a
seriously inhibiting effect upon the willingness to voice critical and constructive
ideas.
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government interference with electronic communications privacy
should be open to challenge on First, as well as Fourth, Amendment
grounds.
A. The Content/Metadata Distinction and the First Amendment
In Bartnicki, the Court recognized the First Amendment value of
conversational privacy where the contents of a private phone call had
been intercepted and subsequently broadcast by the news media.
Bulk metadata collection, conversely, does not involve the capture of
communications content; rather, the government vacuums up email
and call detail records, collecting the email addresses with which we
are in contact, as well as the date, time, duration, and numbers we dial and from which we receive calls. In justifying the NSA’s former
Section 215 program, the Obama Administration and other supporters relied extensively on the “it’s just metadata” argument to assure
the American people that it comported with both the First and
200
The one lower court to rule on a First
Fourth Amendments.
Amendment challenge to the former Section 215 program rejected it,
citing Ninth Circuit decisions that upheld under the First and Fourth
Amendments the recording by postal workers of envelope infor201
mation from an individual’s incoming mail. Unless the contents of
our conversations are seized by the government, this argument goes,
any First Amendment right to conversational privacy that may exist
has not been compromised.
Well before the advent of electronic databases and computer analytics, Justice Stewart pinpointed the flaw in this argument. Dissenting in Smith v. Maryland, he observed that a simple list of numbers dialed by one telephone customer will inevitably disclose substantive
information about the content of those calls: it reveals the identities
of persons and organizations that the individual attempted to con202
Common sense tells us that Justice Stewart was correct: the
tact.

200

201

202

Id. at 533; id. at 543 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
See, e.g., John Yoo, The Legality of the National Security Agency’s Bulk Data Surveillance Programs, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 901, 908 (2014) (stating that “[t]here can be no First
Amendment violation if the content of the calls remains untouched”); ADMIN. WHITE
PAPER, supra note 29, at 21 (emphasizing that the NSA did not collect call content under
the former Section 215 program, and arguing that it did not violate the First Amendment).
ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 753 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), rev’d on other grounds, 785
F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing Lustiger v. United States, 386 F.2d 132, 139 (9th Cir.
1967); Cohen v. United States, 378 F.2d 751, 760 (9th Cir. 1967)).
442 U.S. 735, 748 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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gist of a call can often be inferred simply by knowing to whom the
call is made. The fact that an individual placed even one call or
email to a domestic violence hotline (or a phone sex number) reveals
203
Two
information that the caller may well prefer remain private.
Stanford researchers demonstrated this obvious conclusion in a 2014
study where they collected three months’ worth of metadata from the
204
smartphones of 546 volunteers. Just by looking at isolated numbers
dialed by study participants, the researchers were able to surmise intimate details regarding the participants’ personal lives:
Participants had calls with Alcoholics Anonymous, gun stores, NARAL
Pro-Choice, labor unions, divorce lawyers, sexually transmitted disease
clinics, a Canadian import pharmacy, strip clubs, and much more. This
was not a hypothetical parade of horribles. These were simple inferences, about real phone users, that could trivially be made on a large
205
scale.

When the government collects not only the participating phone
numbers associated with a call, but the time and duration of those
206
calls (as it does with respect to phone records under EO 12333),
the ability to make inferences about conversation content becomes
even more pronounced. One need not be an intelligence analyst to
glean information from the fact that a person placed a two-hour call
to a crisis counseling center at midnight followed by a five-minute call
to a psychiatrist’s office the next morning. Again, in the Stanford
study mentioned above, a mere three months worth of phone
metadata allowed researchers to piece together calling patterns that
207
offered revealing glimpses of their subjects’ private lives. Given the

203

204

205
206

207

Computer science and public affairs professor Edward W. Felten has observed that with
respect to calls to “single-purpose” numbers such as hotlines for rape, domestic violence
or addiction, “metadata is often a proxy for content.” Hearing on Continued Oversight of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong.
18 (2013) (written testimony of Edward W. Felten, Professor of Computer Sci. & Pub. Affairs, Princeton Univ.), http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~felten/testimony-2013-10-02.pdf.
Jonathan Mayer & Patrick Mutchler, MetaPhone: The Sensitivity of Telephone Metadata, WEB
POLICY (Mar. 12, 2014), http://webpolicy.org/2014/03/12/metaphone-the-sensitivity-oftelephone-metadata/.
Id.
See SPCMA, supra note 100, at § 2(a) (defining telephony metadata to include “the telephone number of the calling party, the telephone number of the called party, and the
date, time, and duration of the call”).
Mayer & Mutchler, supra note 204. For example, one study participant phoned “multiple
local neurology groups, a specialty pharmacy, a rare condition management service, and
a hotline for a pharmaceutical used solely to treat relapsing multiple sclerosis.” Id. Another, within a three-week period, called “a home improvement store, locksmiths, a hydroponics dealer, and a head shop.” Id. A third subject spoke at length with her sister before making multiple calls to her local Planned Parenthood office. Id. These were
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revealing nature of these metadata exchanges, the researchers elected not to contact the participants to confirm the substance of their
calls. Their conclusion, however, was straightforward: “phone
208
metadata is highly sensitive.”
Bulk incidental collection under EO 12333 involves government
collection of email and telephony metadata on a much grander scale
than the simple pen register information found objectionable by Justice Stewart back in 1979, or the comparatively tiny dataset examined
in the Stanford study referenced above. Today’s bulk surveillance
programs allow the government to collect and store enormous quantities of its citizens’ communications metadata in the aggregate and
over multiple years for the purpose of subjecting that dataset to high209
Unsurprisingly, it is actually much cheaper
speed digital analysis.
and easier for the government to analyze metadata using advanced
computer technology than it would be to have thousands of intelli210
gence agents listening to millions of individual calls. Even the former general counsel of the NSA has admitted that “[m]etadata absolutely tells you everything about somebody’s life . . . . If you have
211
enough metadata you don’t really need content.”
In the context of the former Section 215 program, supporters responded that any fears regarding the revealing nature of metadata
were overblown given that the NSA collected only telephone num212
bers without the corresponding subscriber identities —an argument
that could also be applied to incidental bulk collection and analysis
under EO 12333. In both instances, however, the conclusion that this

208
209
210

211

212

followed by brief calls to Planned Parenthood two weeks later, and one final call to
Planned Parenthood at the four-week mark. Id.
Mayer & Mutchler, supra note 204.
See supra notes 161–63 and accompanying text.
But see Dan Froomkin, The Computers are Listening: Speech Recognition is NSA’s Best-Kept Open
Secret, INTERCEPT (May 11, 2015), https://theintercept.com/2015/05/11/speechrecognition-nsa-best-kept-secret/ (describing an NSA program that automatically converts
spoken content of telephone calls into searchable phonetic transcripts).
Alan Rusbridger, The Snowden Leaks and the Public, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Nov. 21, 2013
(quoting Stewart Baker), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/nov/21/
snowden-leaks-and-public/.
See Jane Mayer, What’s the Matter with Metadata?, NEW YORKER, June 6, 2013 (describing
Senator Diane Feinstein’s defense of the former Section 215 program as emphasizing
that the NSA collects only phone numbers, not names); see also Ryan McDonald, NSA Director Keith Alexander Defends Data Collection During Baltimore Visit, BALTIMORE BUS. J., Oct.
31,
2013,
http://www.bizjournals.com/baltimore/blog/cyberbizblog/2013/10/nsadirector-keith-alexander-defends.html (reporting that the NSA Director responded to
concerns about the former Section 215 program by noting that the agency does not collect caller identities).
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renders the metadata anonymous is simply wrong. 213 Most of us have
employed publicly available databases to match phone numbers to a
name. Given the myriad resources available to the NSA, it must be
child’s play for such a sophisticated intelligence agency to do the
same. If the NSA truly were incapable of determining someone’s
identity from a phone number, it would be nonsensical for the agency to collect call detail records in the first place. Most email metadata
collected under EO 12333, which include the Internet-protocol address of the computer from which an email was sent, as well as log-in
information pertaining to web-based email accounts, are also easily
214
As an example, consider former CIA Director David
identifiable.
Petraeus, who learned this the hard way after the FBI used email
215
metadata to link a pseudonymous email account to his mistress.
All in all, then, communications metadata is powerful stuff. The
fact that the government subjects incidentally collected domestic
metadata, rather than communications content, to unlimited analysis
under EO 12333 should not foreclose further First Amendment scrutiny.
B. Is the Chilling Effect Real?
Given the revealing nature of communications metadata, incidental government collection of domestic email and call records under the guise of foreign collection could pose a threat to our First
Amendment freedoms by discouraging citizens from speaking frankly
or associating with those whom the government might view with suspicion or disdain. Scholars have argued that government surveillance
strips us of the privacy we need to generate new ideas, to test potentially controversial or unpopular views, and to develop our beliefs by
216
sharing them openly with trusted others. Simple awareness that the
213

214
215

216

For a discussion of how easily “anonymized” datasets can be re-identified, see Paul Ohm,
Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L.
REV. 1701, 1703–04 (2010) (concluding that, because of advances in re-identification science, “[d]ata can be either useful or perfectly anonymous, but never both”).
See SPCMA, supra note 100, at § 2(b).
See Scott Shane & Charlie Savage, Officials Say F.B.I. Knew of Petraeus Affair in the Summer,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2012, at A1 (detailing the F.B.I.’s use of metadata to ascertain an email author’s identity in the investigation of David Patraeus).
See, e.g., Margot E. Kaminski & Shane Witnov, The Conforming Effect: First Amendment Implications of Surveillance, Beyond Chilling Speech, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 465, 467 (2015) (concluding that government surveillance discourages the cultivation of minority viewpoints and
limits individual autonomy); Richards, supra note 23, at 1935 (stating that government
surveillance of intellectual activity, such as communicating with others about political and
social issues, can discourage experimentation with “new, controversial, or deviant ideas”).

854

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 18:3

government collects, stores and analyzes our communications
metadata may make us less likely to communicate, or associate, with
others freely and without fear.
In general, social science research confirms the logical conclusion
that we act differently when we know, or even suspect, that we are be217
This is the reason why closed-circuit television caming observed.
eras have been installed in public streets, transit systems and businesses around the world. Film footage from surveillance cameras
may assist law enforcement in solving crimes, but the mere presence
of cameras also tends to reduce criminal conduct in the first in218
stance. Similarly, some cities have installed cameras at intersections
219
not only to detect but also to deter drivers from running red lights.
These examples show how we often conform our behavior in accordance with social norms when we think we are being watched, even
when the only “watcher” is a machine.
Apologists for the former Section 215 program claim that when
the government gathers our metadata, it is merely collecting information that we already have provided, willingly, to third party service
220
Speakers who really believe that metadata collection
providers.
constrains their expressive freedom, the argument goes, would have
refused to share their metadata with the telephone company or their
Internet service provider in the first place. Even overlooking the ut217

218

219

220

For example, social scientists found that displaying signs with the message “Cycle Thieves,
We Are Watching You” at bike racks on a university campus decreased bicycle thefts at
those locations by 62% over a twelve-month period. Daniel Nettle, Kenneth Nott &
Melissa Bateson, ‘Cycle Thieves, We Are Watching You’: Impact of a Simple Signage Intervention
Against Bicycle Theft, PLOS ONE (Dec. 12, 2012), http://journals.plos.org/plosone/
article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0051738; see also Kaminski & Witnov, supra note 216, at
489–93 (listing and describing additional surveillance-related studies).
See, e.g., NANCY G. LA VIGNE ET AL., URBAN INST. JUSTICE POL’Y CTR., EVALUATING THE USE
OF PUBLIC SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS FOR CRIME CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 87 (2011),
http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/412403-Evaluatingthe-Use-of-Public-Surveillance-Cameras-for-Crime-Control-and-Prevention.PDF (concluding that surveillance cameras, when actively monitored and properly placed, can reduce
crime).
Based on figures comparing the number of collisions in Seattle during the three years
before and after the city installed red-light cameras, the Seattle Department of Transportation found that collisions decreased by about 23% , and collisions involving pedestrians
declined by almost one-third. Will Green, Seattle’s Red Light Cameras Reduce Collisions by
23%, URBANIST (Jan. 23, 2015), http://www.theurbanist.org/2015/01/23/a-look-atseattles-red-light-cameras/.
For instance, at a 2013 debate sponsored by Intelligence Squared U.S., ex-NSA general
counsel Stewart Baker described the former Section 215 program not as “spying on everybody,” but rather as “gathering data that is already in the hands of third parties.” Intelligence Squared U.S., Spy On Me, I’d Rather Be Safe, (Nov. 20, 2013), 12–13,
http://www.scribd.com/doc/200404032/Spy-on-Me-I-d-Rather-Be-Safe-Transcript.
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ter impossibility of surviving in today’s world without communica221
tions devices that, of necessity, create metadata, this contention assumes that sharing data with a business is no different from providing
it to the government, with its singular power to prosecute, investigate
222
In her United States v. Jones concurrence, Justice
and punish.
Sotomayor charged that “[a]wareness that the Government may be
223
The Presiwatching chills associational and expressive freedoms.”
dent’s Review Group quoted Justice Sotomayor to explain its recommendation that Congress terminate the former Section 215 program,
adding that public trust in government is seriously weakened when
citizens know that the government can access their communications
224
metadata with “one flick of a switch.”
Neither Justice Sotomayor nor the President’s Review Group,
however, cited any empirical support for the conclusion that government surveillance deters speech or association. This is understandable; scholars have often noted the difficulties associated with
225
demonstrating the existence of a chilling effect. Nevertheless, since
the Snowden revelations in 2013, various surveys have suggested that
Americans are extremely concerned about government surveillance,
which has caused us to doubt our ability to communicate privately,
and had at least some effect on our communications behavior. According to a 2014 Pew Research Center study, almost 80% of those
surveyed agreed or strongly agreed that “Americans should be concerned about the government’s monitoring of phone calls and inter226
net communications.” More importantly, the study found that most
of those surveyed had lost confidence in the privacy of their electron-

221

222

223
224
225

226

Back in 2010, the Court recognized the growing importance of cell phones, stating in City
of Ontario v. Quon that “[c]ell phone and text message communications are so pervasive
that some persons may consider them to be essential means or necessary instruments for
self-expression, even self-identification.” 560 U.S. 746, 760 (2010).
See Anjali S. Dalal, Shadow Administrative Constitutionalism and the Creation of Surveillance
Culture, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 59, 112 (explaining that sharing information with the government is a “different proposition all together [sic]” than sharing that same information
with a private company).
132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (emphasis added). See also supra
notes 172–75 and accompanying text.
PRG Report, supra note 85, at 117.
See, e.g., Leslie Kendrick, Speech, Intent, and the Chilling Effect, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1633,
1675 (2013) (noting that “[i]t is difficult to establish either the presence or absence of a
chilling effect, let alone to measure the extent of such an effect”); Frederick Schauer,
Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the Chilling Effect, 58 BOSTON U. L. REV. 685,
730 (1978) (stating that as specific predictions about human behavior, chilling effects are
probably “unprovable”).
Pew 2014 Study, supra note 1, at 22.
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ic conversations, whether made via landline phones, cell phones, text
227
messaging, instant messaging, email, or social media messaging.
Other studies have focused on the chilling effect of surveillance
on writers and members of the press. Journalists depend on the telephone and digital devices to gather newsworthy information, sometimes from sources who insist on remaining nameless. Those sources
may be unwilling to communicate by phone or email if they believe
that any promise of confidentiality is rendered meaningless by the
government’s ability to collect and scrutinize their communications
228
metadata. A 2013 PEN America survey of 528 writers/editors found
that 76% of respondents believe that government surveillance programs invade the privacy they needed to be creative; as a result, 24%
of respondents reported avoiding certain topics when communicating by telephone or email, and 16% said they had limited the topics upon which they wrote or spoke for fear that the government was
229
monitoring their communications. A smaller 2014 ACLU/Human
Rights Watch study of U.S. journalists who cover national security issues detailed how the combination of NSA surveillance plus the increased number of prosecutions against government leakers has
dried up sources and made information-gathering much more diffi-

227

228

229

Id. at 23. Unsurprisingly, the more survey respondents knew about government surveillance programs, the less confident they were in their ability to communicate personal information in a confidential manner. Id.
A follow-up Pew survey in 2015 reported that of the 87% of adults who were familiar
with bulk surveillance programs, 34% (30% of all adults) had “taken at least one step to
hide or shield their information from the government.” Lee Rainie & Mary Madden,
Americans’ Privacy Strategies Post-Snowden, PEW RESEARCH CTR., Mar. 16, 2015, at 3. Within
that group, 14% said they had spoken more in person rather than communicating over
the telephone or online; 13% reported avoiding using certain terms when communicating online; and 11% had not used terms they thought might attract government attention when using internet search engines. Id. at 19.
Justice Stewart recognized that confidentiality is essential to newsgathering in his dissent
in Branzburg v. Hayes, where he wrote that “when neither the reporter nor his source can
rely on the shield of confidentiality against unrestrained use of [governmental] power,
valuable information will not be published and the public dialogue will inevitably be impoverished.” 408 U.S. 665, 736 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting). See also infra notes 314–17
and accompanying text; Ross Coulthart, Metadata Access is Putting Whistleblowers, Journalists
and Democracy at Risk, BRISBANE TIMES (May 4, 2015), http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/
comment/metadata-access-is-putting-whistleblowers-journalists-and-democracy-at-risk20150504-1mzfi0.html (describing how an Australian official obtained a journalist’s private phone records, to demonstrate how easily those records revealed the identity of the
journalist’s confidential sources).
PEN American Ctr., Chilling Effects: NSA Surveillance Drives U.S. Writers to Self-Censor (Nov.
12,
2013),
https://www.pen.org/sites/default/files/Chilling%20Effects_PEN%20
American.pdf.
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cult. 230 Participating journalists indicated that government surveillance “constrains their ability to investigate and report on matters of
public concern, and ultimately undermines democratic processes by
231
hindering open, informed debate.”
In its report on the former Section 215 program, the Privacy and
232
Civil Liberties Oversight Board (“PCLOB”) concluded that government collection of telephony metadata created a chilling effect
that not only weakens our free press but also discourages citizen par233
As proof,
ticipation in political, religious and other organizations.
the PCLOB described how groups ranging from Greenpeace to the
National Rifle Association supported legal challenges to the program
on the grounds that metadata collection has prevented them from
communicating freely with members, contributors, politicians, and
234
In one such lawsuit, twenty-two diverse advocacy organizaothers.
tions filed affidavits detailing how, after the Snowden revelations,
they experienced a drop in telephone communications from mem235
bers, whistleblowers, clients, and others. Empirical studies of other
instances of government surveillance have demonstrated that it can
change behavior in ways that diminish the effectiveness of religious or
236
political organizations and social movements.

230

231
232

233
234
235

236

Am. Civil Liberties Union & Human Rights Watch, With Liberty to Monitor All: How LargeScale US Surveillance is Harming Journalism, Law, and American Democracy 22, 24–26 (July 28,
2014),
https://www.aclu.org/report/liberty-monitor-all-how-large-scale-us-surveillanceharming-journalism-law-and-american.
Id. at 24.
The PCLOB is an independent, bipartisan executive branch agency that was authorized,
as currently structured, by Congress in 2007. See About the Board, PRIVACY & CIVIL
LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., https://www.pclob.gov/index.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2015)
(providing a broad overview of the PCLOB’s authority, responsibilities, and history). Its
mission is “to ensure that the federal government’s efforts to prevent terrorism are balanced with the need to protect privacy and civil liberties.” PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES
OVERSIGHT BD., https://www.pclob.gov/about-us.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2015). For a
discussion of the board’s troubled history and how its lack of staffing could limit its overall effectiveness, see Dalal, supra note 222, at 121–23.
PCLOB Section 215 Report, supra note 7, at 162.
Id. at 164.
The affidavits in the lawsuit, First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles v. NSA, Civ. No. 133287 (N.D. Cal.) (complaint filed July 16, 2013) are available at https://www.eff.org/
document/all-plaintiffs-declarations.
See, e.g., Tom Tyler, Stephen Schulhofer & Aziz Z. Huq, Legitimacy and Deterrence Effects in
Counterterrorism Policing: A Study of Muslim Americans, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV., 365, 396
(2010) (finding that 20% of surveyed Muslim-Americans reported lower mosque attendance in response to increased law enforcement scrutiny of Muslims).
Another study of seventy-one social justice organizations found that government surveillance caused them to engage in self-censorship, and deprived them of members, donations, and access to space in which to share ideas. Amory Starr, et al., The Impacts of
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While these polls, studies, and reports provide support for the existence of a chilling effect attached to government collection of
communications metadata, some might fault the evidence for being
overly anecdotal and conclusory, or for taking inadequate account of
multiple causes for behavioral changes. Skeptics might point out that
during the year following the Snowden revelations, Americans may
not have trusted their cell phones, but they certainly continued to use
237
them.
More importantly, all the studies mentioned in this Part were
conducted before Congress passed the Freedom Act, which, as described in Part I, imposed some limits on the NSA’s surveillance activities under FISA but had no effect on similar activities under EO
12333. The fanfare accompanying the Freedom Act’s passage may
well have convinced some Americans that their communications records would no longer reside in NSA databases. Consider as well that
NSA intelligence gathering under EO 12333 is veiled in secrecy, making it a safe bet that most Americans know little about how the NSA
captures and analyzes American metadata as part of its foreign intelligence mandate. While the Snowden leaks forced the government to
admit that the NSA collected almost all of our domestic call detail
records under the former Section 215 program, the government has
remained silent about the scope of incidental collection of American
238
communications metadata under EO 12333. A government surveillance program regarding which most Americans remain entirely ignorant—despite efforts by NSA whistleblower John Napier Tye to ed239
ucate the public described in Part I —seems unlikely to exert a
major chilling effect on protected speech.
Studies to date, then, establish that revelations about government
surveillance programs in general have created anxiety among many
Americans regarding the privacy of their communications. Fear regarding this lack of privacy can hinder the operation of our free
press, undermine our trust in government, and cause us to secondguess what we say and with whom we associate. Nevertheless, it may
be impossible to demonstrate, and implausible to believe, that NSA

237

238
239

State Surveillance on Political Assembly and Association: A Socio-Legal Analysis, 31 QUALITATIVE
SOC. 251, 267–68 (2008).
In the last quarter of 2014, the nation’s four largest wireless communications service providers gained between almost a million to two million new subscribers. See Dennis
Bournique, Fourth Quarter 2014 Prepaid Mobile Subscriber Numbers By Operator, PREPAID
PHONE NEWS (Feb. 19, 2015), http://www.prepaidphonenews.com/2015/02/fouthquarter-2014-prepaid-mobile.html.
See infra notes 401–05 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 112–13 and accompanying text.
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collection and analysis of American communications metadata under
EO 12333 in particular has any untoward effect on First Amendment
activities, given that most Americans are unaware of EO 12333’s existence. While the Supreme Court has, on occasion, invalidated laws
in part based on their purported chilling effects without much in the
240
way of evidence to back up its assumptions, whether the Court
would be willing to engage in imaginative speculation in this instance
would be, at best, a long shot.
C. If a Chilling Effect Exists, Is It Legally Cognizable under the First
Amendment?
Even assuming that government surveillance under EO 12333 results in a discernible chilling effect on citizens’ First Amendment activities, the mere existence of a chilling effect on speech or association, by itself, will be insufficient to support a First Amendment
241
Much of government regulation is meant to deter citizens
claim.
from engaging in certain proscribable acts by imposing criminal punishments or civil liability. This natural and expected result is not constitutionally problematic; it constitutes what Frederick Schauer has
described as a “benign chilling effect—an effect caused by the intentional regulation of speech or activity properly subject to government
242
control.” The fear of being issued a traffic ticket helps ensure that I
obey the speed limit. In the speech context, the threat of civil liability under state libel law is meant to discourage the press from knowingly or recklessly publishing defamatory falsehoods about local officials. In this context, libel law restricts a newspaper’s ability to
publish speech it knows or should know is false, but properly so; defamatory speech in these circumstances can be punished under exist243
ing First Amendment doctrine.
A chilling effect becomes constitutionally suspect, or, in Professor
Schauer’s lexicon, “invidious,” when otherwise proper government
240

241

242
243

See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 390 (1974) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court had provided no evidence to conclude that the threat of libel suits
brought by private citizens would deter truthful news coverage); Kendrick, supra note
225, at 1656–57 (stating that “[i]n signal areas such as defamation and obscenity, the
Court has provided no evidence whatsoever to support either its diagnosis of chilling or
its favored cure,” and citing cases).
See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 50 (1971) (“[T]he existence of a ‘chilling effect,’ even
in the area of First Amendment rights, has never been considered a sufficient basis, in
and of itself, for prohibiting state action.”).
Schauer, supra note 225, at 690.
See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010) (listing defamation as a category of speech that can be regulated under the First Amendment).
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regulation has the indirect consequence of discouraging expression
that falls within the zone of First Amendment protection because the
244
speaker fears punishment or other adverse consequence. Given the
unavoidable uncertainties and costs of both litigation and legal compliance, a would-be speaker may choose to remain silent rather than
245
246
expose herself to potential criminal prosecution, civil liability, in247
248
249
For
creased costs, retaliation, or loss of a government benefit.
example, the same libel laws that serve to protect individual reputations may also cause risk-averse publishers to err on the side of caution, with the result that truthful matters of public importance remain unexpressed. The Court’s landmark decision of New York Times
250
v. Sullivan reflects a policy determination that a democratic society
is better served by legal rules that encourage free debate even at the
251
cost of overprotecting some defamatory falsehoods.
Even with respect to invidious chilling effects, however, not every
law or government activity that somehow discourages constitutionally
protected speech will be found to violate the First Amendment. In
cases where laws or regulatory programs have been invalidated because they have a chilling effect on speech, those laws have imposed
some type of punishment, sanction or threat of reprisal on the speaker. The government must have done something that could harm an
252
So, for example, in
individual because of her protected speech.
Sullivan, the state libel law chilled expression by subjecting speakers
244
245
246

247

248

249

250

251
252

Schauer, supra note 225, at 693.
See, e.g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 152–54 (1959) (invalidating a city ordinance
that made booksellers criminally liable for unknowing possession of obscene materials).
See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277 (1964) (finding that the fear of
civil damage awards “may be markedly more inhibiting than the fear of prosecution under a criminal statute”).
See, e.g., Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256–57 (1974) (invalidating a statute that
required newspaper editors to provide political candidates with space to respond to published criticisms).
See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486–89 (1965) (finding that repeated labeling by state officials of an organization as “subversive,” plus state seizures of the groups’
records, scared off potential members and contributors).
See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518–19 (1958) (invalidating a state law that denied property tax exemption to veterans who refused to sign a loyalty oath, stating that
“to deny an exemption to claimants who engage in certain forms of speech is in effect to
penalize them for such speech”).
376 U.S. at 279–80 (1964) (holding that to prevail in a libel action, public officials must
prove that false statements regarding their official conduct were published with either
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth).
Id. at 271–72.
In the Court’s words, government actions create an unconstitutional chilling effect only
when those actions are “regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature.” Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11 (1972).
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to the risk of civil liability. Similarly, in Miami Herald v. Tornillo, a
state right of reply statute was found to violate the First Amendment
because it forced newspapers to pay the costs, in space, paper, and
ink, of printing a response to previously published political commen253
Rather than subsidize someone else’s speech, the Court contary.
cluded, some editors would simply refuse to publish controversial po254
The actionable chilling effect resulted
litical opinions altogether.
from an unconstitutional ultimatum: any editor who chose to express
a political opinion could be required to finance someone else’s point
of view.
Conversely, valid government rules and regulations of general applicability frequently operate to chill even our protected speech in a
way that courts view as merely incidental. For example, the presence
of airport security may keep me from making jokes about terrorism at
the airport, yet we would all agree that the screeners’ presence is not
constitutionally problematic. In these cases, courts balance the importance of the state interest advanced by the law or regulatory program against the magnitude of the chilling effect on expressive activi255
256
The Court’s decision in Branzburg v Hayes, a case involving
ties.
the general duty of all citizens to testify regarding their knowledge of
criminal activities, is a good example of this approach. There, the
Court refused to grant reporters a special First Amendment right to
refuse to testify before grand juries regarding information provided
to them by confidential sources, finding that any deterrent effect on
the willingness of sources to speak with the press was both uncertain
and outweighed by government’s countervailing interest in protect257
Only if it could be shown that the government
ing public safety.
convened a grand jury in bad faith to harass or intimidate a particular
journalist, rather than to fight crime, did the Court indicate that the
258
First Amendment would require a different result.
Applying these principles to secret government surveillance programs demonstrates why a stand-alone First Amendment claim based
on chilling effects is unlikely to succeed. When the NSA passively col253
254
255

256
257
258

418 U.S. 241, 256–57 (1974).
Id. at 257.
See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 51 (1971) (“Where a statute does not directly
abridge free speech, but—while regulating a subject within the State’s power—tends to
have the incidental effect of inhibiting First Amendment rights, it is well settled that the
statute can be upheld if the effect on speech is minor in relation to the need for control
of the conduct and the lack of alternative means for doing so.”).
408 U.S. 665 (1972).
Id. at 690–91.
Id. at 707–08.
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lects communications metadata under EO 12333, the agency neither
prohibits any speech nor imposes any punishment on those who engage in lawful communications. Absent abuse, metadata collection
carries no consequence other than the possibility of further investigation should analysis reveal that a U.S. person is in contact with a suspected terrorist. Like Branzburg’s requirement that every citizen provide his or her testimony in a criminal case, then, the NSA’s bulk
collection of communications metadata under EO 12333 is a pro259
gram of general applicability, and the program’s effect on speech
260
The balance of interests cannot help
will be deemed incidental.
but favor the government, given that foreign-intelligence-gathering
activities serve to keep the nation safe from foreign terrorism, a state
261
This fundamental state interest caninterest of the highest order.
not be outweighed given that—thanks in large part to government
secrecy surrounding the program—the amount of speech chilled by
the existence of EO 12333 collection is uncertain at best, and, most
likely, insignificant.
A First Amendment challenge to government surveillance based
on its chilling effect on freedom of association would seem to provide
a stronger basis to oppose NSA surveillance under EO 12333. After
all, the whole purpose of collecting communications metadata and
subjecting it to potentially unlimited contact chaining under
262
SPCMA is to give the NSA the ability to map social connections
among correspondents so it can look for potential terrorists and their
263
collaborators. More than fifty years ago, the Court in NAACP v. Alabama held that the state could not force the NAACP to comply with
a disclosure order to provide its membership list to state officials, because to do so would violate NAACP members’ right to associate to
264
Compelled identification of
advance their opinions and beliefs.
259

260

261
262
263
264

As described in Part I, EO 12333 collection falls outside of the FISA warrant requirements
for the very reason that the NSA does not target specific Americans when it engages in
vacuum-cleaner-style foreign-based surveillance. See supra Part I. By the same token, untargeted collection of communications metadata would, by definition, fall outside the bad
faith exception identified in Branzburg. 408 U.S. 665, 707–08 (1972).
See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 611–13 (1985) (finding that government policy
of prosecuting those draft resisters who self-reported their failure to register imposed an
incidental burden on speech that was justified by the important interest in effective enforcement of the draft laws).
See, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (“It is ‘obvious and unarguable’ that no
governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.”).
See supra notes 94–104 and accompanying text.
See Strandburg, supra note 24, at 327–28 (describing the goal of comprehensive metadata
collection as “relational surveillance”).
357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958).
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group members, while not directly stifling speech, could thwart an
organization’s ability to attract and retain members, especially when a
265
group promotes controversial or unpopular views.
While the Court noted that the right to privacy of group association is not absolute, it concluded that the disclosure order in these
facts amounted to a “substantial restraint” on group members’ free266
dom of association. This was so, the Court emphasized, because the
NAACP had produced strong evidence that, in the past, its members
had been subjected to threats of “economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of public
267
On the other side of the balance, the Court found that
hostility.”
the state had failed to demonstrate that disclosure of the membership
list substantially advanced its asserted state interest in determining
whether the NAACP had complied with Alabama’s foreign corpora268
tion registration statute.
One obvious difference between NAACP and NSA collection of
communications metadata is that the NSA compels no organization
to reveal its adherents; rather, the NSA has itself gathered the communications metadata from which it infers a target’s social connections. In that sense, the government’s collection and analysis of
metadata could be characterized as an independent investigation,
similar to what in the old days would have required the FBI to send a
bevy of agents to follow suspected terrorists and monitor their interactions with others. Viewed this way, the government could avoid
NCAAP’s holding by taking advantage of technological advances that
allow it to compile membership lists without having to ask for them.
Whether this should make a constitutional difference is doubtful. As
Professor Katherine Strandburg has observed with respect to the
former Section 215 program, “[t]he fact that associational information must be inferred from the metadata rather than merely read
from a list does little to limit the program’s potential to chill associa269
tional activity.”
A more significant distinction is the fact that the chilling effect on
association recognized by the Court in NAACP resulted from the very
real likelihood of reprisals against group members should their iden-

265
266
267
268
269

Id. at 462.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 464–65.
Strandburg, supra note 24, at 359.
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tities be revealed. 270 Not only did the disclosure order target the
NCAAP directly, the organization had shown past instances where
members, once identified as such, lost their jobs, were physically
271
threatened, and suffered other economic and social harms. In later
cases, the Court has required those resisting disclosure requirements
on the grounds of associational privacy to show “a reasonable probability that the compelled disclosure . . . will subject them to threats,
harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or private
272
In Doe v. Reed, for example, the Court rejected a facial
parties.”
challenge to a state public records act provision that required state
officials to provide on request copies of referendum petitions con273
Although the petition
taining the signers’ names and addresses.
signers alleged that disclosure would expose them to harassment and
intimidation by groups with opposing political views, the Court found
that the signers had provided insufficient evidence to support their
274
fears.
Based on our admittedly limited knowledge, NSA collection of
communications metadata under EO 12333 targets no U.S. persons,
imposes no punishments, and inflicts no tangible harms (except,
perhaps, on terrorists and their associates). While those few Americans who are aware of NSA surveillance under EO 12333 may be less
likely to communicate with foreigners or join dissident organizations,
this hardly equals the campaign of harassment suffered by NAACP
members in Alabama during the 1950s. As a result, courts are unlikely to view the NSA’s passive collection of metadata as creating a “seri275
ous burden” on Americans’ right of expressive association.
Finally, while the Court has indicated that restrictions on freedom
of association must survive “exacting scrutiny,” those restrictions will
be upheld if they “serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the
suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means signifi270

271
272

273
274
275

For a discussion of how the Alabama Citizens’ Councils retaliated against civil rights advocates in the 1950s, see John D. Inazu, The Strange Origins of the Constitutional Right of Association, 77 TENN. L. REV. 485, 508–10 (2010).
NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462.
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976) (per curiam); see also Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 370 (2010) (citing McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540
U.S. 93, 198 (2003)).
561 U.S. 186 (2010).
Id. at 199–201. However, the Court acknowledged the possibility of a future as-applied
challenge to the law with respect to a particular petition. Id. at 201.
See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 658–59 (2000) (noting that “in the associational freedom cases . . . after finding a compelling state interest, the Court went on to
examine whether or not the application of the state law would impose any ‘serious burden’ on the organization’s rights of expressive association”).
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cantly less restrictive of associational freedoms.” 276 Foreign intelligence gathering, including NSA collection and analysis of communications metadata, is defended by the government as a means to combat terrorism, an interest described by the Court as “an urgent
277
objective of the highest order.” Could the government fight terrorism as effectively without subjecting our communications metadata to
indiscriminate collection and analysis? Given the secrecy surrounding EO 12333, it would be impossible for someone without a highlevel security clearance to tell. It’s worth noting, however, that the
Court has recently resolved other questions of free speech and association in the national security context by according great deference
278
to government claims of necessity, a trend that is likely to contin279
ue.
D. The Problem of Standing
All of this discussion may be academic in the sense that it overlooks a more fundamental problem: even if government collection
and analysis of domestic communications metadata chills speech
and/or association, will anyone have standing to seek redress in
court? Under Article III standing doctrine, to have a justiciable
claim, a litigant must demonstrate that she has suffered an injury that
is “concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable
280
to the challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling.” In
the surveillance context, the Supreme Court has interpreted the first
two of these requirements to make it next to impossible for litigants
to mount a court challenge to secret government surveillance programs.
The Court first addressed a challenge to government surveillance
281
in Laird v. Tatum, where the plaintiffs objected that their First
Amendment rights had been chilled by the “mere existence” of a U.S.
276

277
278

279
280
281

Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984). So, for example, the Court has upheld
federal campaign finance disclosure requirements despite their potential chilling effect
on would-be donors based on the compelling state interest in informing the electorate
and countering campaign corruption. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68.
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28 (2010).
Id. at 7 (upholding federal law prohibiting provision of “material support or resources” to
certain terrorist organizations against free speech and free association claims brought by
human rights organizations).
See Dalal, supra note 222, at 114–16 (describing how courts grant the executive branch a
type of “super-deference” with respect to national security matters).
Monsanto Co. v. Geerston Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010) (citing Horne v. Flores,
557 U.S. 433, 445 (2009)).
408 U.S. 1 (1972).
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Army program that compiled information regarding lawful civilian
282
A 5-4
political activities thought to present a risk of civil disorder.
majority dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim as non-justiciable, holding that
“allegations of a subjective ‘chill’ are not an adequate substitute for a
claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future
283
While the Court in Laird did not reach the merits of the
harm.”
First Amendment claim, it emphasized that the plaintiffs had presented no evidence that the government had engaged in any illegal
surveillance practices; in fact, most of the information collected by
Army intelligence agents came from public sources such as the news
284
The Court indicated that its decision might have been difmedia.
ferent had the government engaged in unlawful conduct, stating that
nothing in its holding “can properly be seen as giving any indication
that actual or threatened injury by reasons of unlawful activities of the
285
military would go unnoticed or unremedied.”
More than forty years later, however, plaintiffs who claimed that a
secret government surveillance program was unlawful under the First
and Fourth Amendments, Article III and separation of powers doc286
trine fared no better. In Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, the
Court extended the Laird holding to deny standing to plaintiffs who
alleged to have suffered both actual and threatened harm from cov287
ert government surveillance conducted under Section 702 of FISA.
That program authorizes the NSA to capture communications of
non-U.S. persons who are reasonably believed to be located outside
288
the United States without a showing of individualized suspicion.
However, Section 702 also expands the government’s ability to monitor Americans’ communications, given that U.S. persons who communicate with foreigners may also have their private messages “inci289
dentally” collected.
The Clapper plaintiffs consisted of U.S. persons whose work as attorneys, human rights activists, and journalists required them to

282
283
284
285
286
287
288

289

Id. at 2, 10.
Id. at 12–14.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 16.
133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
Id. at 1143.
50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a)–(b) (2012) (allowing the AG and the DNI to jointly authorize, for
the purpose of acquiring foreign intelligence information, the surveillance of non-U.S.
persons who are reasonably believed to be located abroad).
For more information about the Section 702 program, including incidental collection of
communications belonging to or concerning U.S. persons, see the PCLOB Section 702
Report, supra note 93.
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communicate by telephone and email with foreigners who were likely
290
targets of Section 702 surveillance. The plaintiffs argued that, as a
result of their reasonable fear that their overseas electronic communications would be intercepted by the NSA, their future ability to
gather information, develop sources, and communicate privately with
291
their clients would be impaired. Additionally, they claimed that the
surveillance threat had already forced them to take “costly and burdensome measures,” such overseas travel, to ensure the confidentiali292
ty of their conversations.
In a 5-4 decision, the Court rejected these arguments. First, the
plaintiffs’ claims of likely future injury were seen by the Court as too
speculative because the plaintiffs had failed to establish that their
communications had been or would be, in fact, intercepted by the
293
(Of course, plaintiffs had no way to prove this—
government.
secrecy is, by definition, an essential component of covert government surveillance.) What the plaintiffs, and the Court of Appeals,
294
saw as an “objectively reasonable likelihood” that the plaintiffs’
communications would be monitored was, to the Court, nothing
more than a “speculative chain of possibilities” insufficient to demon295
strate the existence of a “certainly impending” injury.
Compounding the plaintiffs’ problems with proof was the fact that
the government has multiple legal authorities under which it can
conduct foreign surveillance, including EO 12333. For plaintiffs to
survive the traceability prong of the standing test, Justice Alito reasoned that plaintiffs would have to demonstrate not only that their
communications actually had been intercepted by the NSA, but also
that the interceptions occurred pursuant to Section 702 and not
296
some other statutory provision or executive order. Even in the rare
case where a plaintiff could produce actual evidence of covert government surveillance, the existence of overlapping legal authorities
for intelligence gathering means that a plaintiff may never be able to
demonstrate conclusively that she was surveilled pursuant to one authority or another.

290
291
292
293
294
295
296

For example, two plaintiffs were attorneys who had represented Guantanamo Bay detainees charged with terrorism. Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1157–58 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 1146.
Id. at 1148.
Id. at 1143, 1146 (citing Amnesty Int’l United States v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 133, 134,
139 (2d Cir. 2011)).
Id. at 1150.
Id. at 1149.
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Second, Justice Alito also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that
they had already suffered a sufficient injury for standing purposes
given the expenses they had incurred to ensure the privacy of their
communications. According to the Court, any economic costs borne
by the plaintiffs could not fairly be attributed to Section 702 surveillance, but rather were the product of plaintiffs’ own subjective, hypo297
Justice Alito exthetical—but admittedly not irrational—fears.
pressed concern that a contrary decision would allow the plaintiffs to
“manufacture standing merely by inflicting harm on themselves based
on their fears of hypothetical future harm that is not certainly im298
He was apparently less concerned that the Court’s reapending.”
soning allowed the government to defeat standing simply by keeping
silent and insisted that the Court’s holding would not insulate Section 702 from judicial review. Because FISA requires that the government provide notice of its intent to use information derived from
Section 702 in a criminal prosecution, Justice Alito noted that defendants who receive such notice could bring a constitutional chal299
lenge to the statute.
Writing for the dissenters, Justice Breyer disputed the Court’s
finding that the plaintiffs’ future injuries were too speculative, noting
that Section 702 surveillance of plaintiffs’ communications in these
facts was “as likely to take place as are most future events that com297

298
299

Id. at 1151 (stating that “[i]f the law were otherwise, an enterprising plaintiff would be
able to secure a lower standard for Article III standing simply by making an expenditure
based on a nonparanoid fear”).
Id.
Under FISA, the government is required to notify defendants when it uses evidence “obtained or derived” from Section 702 surveillance. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1806(c), 1881e(a). Ironically, at the time Clapper was argued and decided, the Department of Justice was not
providing this required notice to criminal defendants, in direct contradiction of assurances given to the Court by the Solicitor General. See Adam Liptak, A Secret Surveillance
Program Proves Challengeable in Theory Only, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2013, at A11 (explaining
that despite the solicitor general’s assertions, federal prosecutors refused to make the
requisite disclosures in criminal prosecutions). Since that time the government has notified at least two criminal defendants that evidence had been obtained against them pursuant to warrantless surveillance under the Section 702 program. See Ellen Nakashima,
Man Convicted in Terrorism Case Seeks Evidence from Warrantless NSA Surveillance, WASH.
POST, (Jan. 13, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/manconvicted-in-terror-case-challenges-warrantless-spying/2014/01/13/af7da5de-7cba-11e395c6-0a7aa80874bc_story.html (noting that federal prosecutors notified a defendant in
Colorado as well as a defendant in Oregon “that evidence from a warrantless wiretap was
used against [them]”). One of these defendants brought a constitutional challenge to
Section 702, which was rejected by a federal district court. See United States v. Mohamud,
No. 3:10-CR-00475-KI-1, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85452, at *30, *32 (D. Or. June 24, 2014)
(rejecting defendant’s arguments challenging the constitutionality of Section 702 under
the First and Fourth Amendments).

Feb. 2016]

SYNERGY OF PRIVACY AND SPEECH

869

monsense inferences and ordinary knowledge of human nature tell
300
This was so, Justice Breyer reasoned, because the
us will happen.”
government had both strong motives as well as the technical ability to
intercept communications belonging to the plaintiffs’ foreign con301
tacts. A “reasonable probability” of harm, not an absolute certainty
of occurrence, had been required by the Court in past cases and, according to Justice Breyer, was the appropriate standard for the Court
302
to grant standing in these facts.
Commentators were quick to fault Clapper for setting the standing
barrier so high as to make it virtually impossible to bring a public interest lawsuit to challenge secret government surveillance pro303
grams. Legal scholars have criticized the Court’s “certainly impend304
ing” requirement as well as its cramped conception of “injury,”
arguing that covert surveillance results in numerous harms both to
individuals and to society that should be recognized as such in stand305
ing doctrine. And while the Court’s decision did not entirely close
the courthouse door with respect to the constitutionality of the Section 702 program thanks to FISA’s defendant-notification provision,

300
301
302
303

304

305

Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1155 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1158–59.
Id. at 1165.
See, e.g., Editorial, Unbridled Secrecy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2013, at A24 (calling the decision
a “clear-cut abdication of its fundamental role in the American constitutional system of
checks and balances”); Jonathan Turley, Supreme Court Rejects Challenge to Secret Surveillance,
RES IPSA LOQUITUR (Feb. 27, 2013), http://jonathanturley.org/2013/02/27/supremecourt-rejects-challenge-to-secret-surveillance/ (describing decision as “a true nightmare
for civil liberties”).
See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Standing and the Role of Federal Courts: Triple Error Decisions in
Clapper v. Amnesty International USA and City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 23 WM. & MARY
BILL OF RTS. J. 127, 144–46 (2014) (suggesting that the Court follow the lead of the European Court of Human Rights to hold that individuals may challenge covert surveillance if
they can show a “reasonable likelihood” of having been subject to surveillance or that
they are members of a group that is “at risk” of being surveilled); Slobogin, supra note 38,
at 520 (arguing that “any litigant whose participation in the political process is concretely
affected by covert surveillance should have standing” to challenge that surveillance).
See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 304, at 134–35 (contending that by denying justiciability in
Clapper, the Court potentially harmed millions of Americans’ privacy rights, created an
incentive for unlawful leaks of classified information, impaired democratic selfgovernance, and damaged the Court’s role in our constitutional system); Kaminski &
Witnov, supra note 216, at 514–15 (suggesting that surveillance creates a “conforming effect” that should be considered as an injury for the purposes of standing); Richards, supra
note 23, at 1936 (arguing that standing doctrine should recognize that surveillance
“menaces intellectual privacy and increases the risk of blackmail, coercion, and discrimination”); Slobogin, supra note 38, at 519–20 (asserting that covert government surveillance harms the political process).
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no comparable notice requirement applies to evidence derived from
306
an EO 12333 intercept.
Unchecked executive branch surveillance power presents serious
risks to privacy, speech and our democratic processes. Left unrestrained, the government’s exercise of that surveillance power is likely
to continue to expand. If the judicial branch is to play its constitutionally mandated role in our political system, persons with nonfrivolous claims of objectively reasonable harm stemming from credible constitutional violations should not be barred from seeking judicial redress, especially when the claims relate to a topic as vital to our
free society as covert government surveillance. Accordingly, the
Court should abandon Clapper’s overly narrow conception of standing, and allow putative plaintiffs to pursue their claims as long as they
can demonstrate an objectively reasonable likelihood of injury from
the chilling effects of government surveillance. However, while Clapper remains the controlling precedent, it will impose a nearinsurmountable threshold requirement for law-abiding Americans to
challenge secret government surveillance programs based on the
First or Fourth Amendments.
IV. AT THE CONVERGENCE OF PRIVACY AND SPEECH
So far, this Article has looked at bulk government collection and
analysis of domestic communications metadata from two isolated perspectives. Part II showed how, under the Fourth Amendment, the
third party doctrine holds that Americans have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the transactional data relating to their communications, including the phone numbers or addresses (physical or
email) with which they correspond. With respect to the First
Amendment, Part III demonstrated that, under relevant caselaw, government surveillance programs that neither prohibit nor punish
speech, nor target the communications of any particular group, are
unlikely to present a cognizable, invidious chilling effect on speech
or association. As the crowning blow, the Court narrowed the rules
307
of standing in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA to make it almost

306

307

See Charlie Savage, Reagan-Era Order on Surveillance Violates Rights, Says Departing Aide, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 14, 2014, at A12, A14 (citing assertions by government officials that criminal
defendants are not entitled to notice if surveillance conducted under EO 12333 leads to
evidence used against them).
133 S. Ct. 1138, 1150 (2013) (requiring that plaintiffs establish that their “injury based on
potential future surveillance is certainly impending or is fairly traceable to [Section
702]”). See supra notes 286–306 and accompanying text.
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impossible for a First or Fourth Amendment challenge to a covert
government surveillance program to be heard in court at all.
Given our much-vaunted constitutional rights of privacy and free
expression, how can this be the right result? Putting the standing
question to one side, are the protections of the First and Fourth
Amendments really so tepid that the government can accidentally-onpurpose gather and scrutinize enormous quantities of our so-called
“foreign” communications records in an unlimited fashion and with
impunity? Surely the serious risks to privacy, as well as the grave dangers of official abuse, presented when the government accumulates
its citizens’ communication records for future analysis deserve more
searching Fourth Amendment consideration than perfunctory dis308
By the same token, it is bemissal under the third party doctrine.
yond dispute that citizens in a democracy need secure, private methods of communication to facilitate both personal and political
expression and association, as well as to ensure the proper functioning of both a free press and a representative government. Government collection and analysis of what are essentially domestic communication records, therefore, implicates our rights to self-government,
conversational privacy, personal and political association, autonomy
and basic liberty—all First Amendment interests that should be recognized in determining the constitutionality of an official surveil309
lance regime —even if those communications traveled through a
foreign cable or happen to be stored on an extraterritorial back-up
server.
308

309

This constitutional insufficiency has, of course, been observed by others. See, e.g., Jed
Rubenfeld, The End of Privacy, 61 STAN. L. REV. 101, 104 (2008) (arguing that the third
party doctrine would allow the government to deploy secret, undercover spies to record
all of our public acts and conversations, a “totalitarian form of surveillance deeply antithetical to the freedom from state scrutiny of our personal lives for which the Fourth
Amendment stands”).
Almost fifty years ago, and a generation before the invention of modern surveillance
technology, Justice William O. Douglas recognized the First Amendment implications of
government surveillance:
The time may come when no one can be sure whether his words are being recorded for use at some future time; when everyone will fear that his most secret
thoughts are no longer his own, but belong to the Government; when the most
confidential and intimate conversations are always open to eager, prying ears.
When that time comes, privacy, and with it liberty, will be gone. If a man’s privacy
can be invaded at will, who can say he is free? If his every word is taken down and
evaluated, or if he is afraid every word may be, who can say he enjoys freedom of
speech? If his every association is known and recorded, if the conversations with
his associates are purloined, who can say he enjoys freedom of association? When
such conditions obtain, our citizens will be afraid to utter any but the safest and
most orthodox thoughts; afraid to associate with any but the most acceptable people. Freedom as the Constitution envisages it will have vanished.
Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 353–54 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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In this Part, I contend that the First Amendment value of communications privacy must be factored into the determination of
whether a government surveillance program violates the Fourth
310
When considered in tandem this way, the two
Amendment.
Amendments mutually reinforce each other and create a synergy that
311
This is more than mere constituextends the protections of each.
tional theory; the Supreme Court has taken this exact approach with
respect to domestic security surveillance in the landmark 1972 case of
312
United States v. U.S. District Court (the Keith case). There, the Court
incorporated First Amendment values into its Fourth Amendment
analysis to hold that electronic surveillance of U.S. citizens who had
no relation to foreign terrorism was unreasonable without a warrant.
Keith provides the appropriate method of analysis/precedent for the
Court to reconsider and limit the third party doctrine in the context
of bulk government collection of communications metadata. The
question then becomes how both Fourth and First Amendment considerations, as well as the undisputedly essential need to keep our nation safe from foreign terrorism, can be accommodated in the implementation of government surveillance programs that incidentally
sweep in records of U.S. person communications.
A. “Scrupulous Exactitude”
Both courts and commentators have often noted the strong histor313
ical connection between the First and the Fourth Amendments. In
the words of Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., “[t]he Bill of Rights was
fashioned against the background of knowledge that unrestricted
power of search and seizure could also be an instrument for stifling
314
liberty of expression.” From its inception, the Fourth Amendment
was designed to protect the First Amendment values of free speech
310

311
312
313

314

Professor Akhil Reed Amar urged this approach to the Fourth Amendment more than
twenty years ago, long before the Snowden era of NSA surveillance. See Akhil Reed Amar,
Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 805 (1994) (“In thinking about
the broad command of the Fourth Amendment, we must examine other parts of the Bill
of Rights to identify constitutional values that are elements of constitutional reasonableness.”).
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) (“[T]he First Amendment has a
penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion.”).
407 U.S. 297 (1972).
See, e.g., Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 482 (1965) (stating that the history of the Fourth
Amendment “is largely a history of conflict between the Crown and the press”); see also
Solove, supra note 193, at 133 (“The First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments share a common background in concerns about seditious libel.”).
Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 729 (1961).
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and press from government abuse of its investigative powers. That
the interplay between privacy and speech should make a difference in
the strength of Fourth Amendment protections has been recognized
by the Court, starting in a series of cases dealing with government seizures of books and films alleged to be obscene. In these cases, the
Court invalidated large-scale seizures of multiple copies of magazines
and books, even though authorities had valid search warrants that
315
would have satisfied the Fourth Amendment in another context.
Because even obscene publications enjoy presumptive First Amendment protection, the Court found that pretrial seizures of those materials require pre-seizure procedures “designed to focus searchingly
316
on the question of obscenity.”
The presence of First Amendment values has also caused the
Court to interpret Fourth Amendment warrant exceptions more nar317
rowly. In Roaden v. Kentucky, a local sheriff viewed a movie at a
drive-in theater, determined that it was obscene, arrested the theater
manager in the projection booth for displaying obscenity, and re318
moved one copy of the film as evidence. While the lower court upheld the seizure as incident to a lawful arrest, a standard warrant ex319
ception, the Supreme Court reversed, warning that the Fourth
320
Amendment “must not be read in a vacuum.” Seizures of weapons
or contraband must be differentiated, the Court said, from seizures of
books or films, where First Amendment values are also in play. “The
setting of the bookstore or the commercial theater, each presumptively under the protection of the First Amendment,” Chief Justice
Burger wrote for the Court, “invokes such Fourth Amendment warrant requirements because we examine what is ‘unreasonable’ in the
321
light of the values of freedom of expression.” Roaden stands for the
proposition that Fourth Amendment reasonableness must be redefined pursuant to stricter standards when First Amendment interests
322
are implicated by the search or seizure in question.

315
316
317
318
319

320
321
322

A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964); Marcus, 367 U.S. at 738.
Marcus, 367 U.S. at 732; see also Quantity of Books, 378 U.S. at 210–11 (quoting Marcus, 367
U.S. at 732).
413 U.S. 496 (1973).
Id. at 497–98.
See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969) (explaining that when an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person of the arrestee
for weapons and/or evidence, along with the area “within his immediate control” without
a search warrant).
Roaden, 413 U.S. at 501.
Id. at 504.
Id.
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Yet in a case that presented a paradigmatic example of a conflict
between the state and the press, the Court in Zurcher v. Stanford Dai323
ly paid mere lip service to its “scrupulous exactitude” formulation to
approve an innocent third-party search of a newsroom. In that case,
Stanford’s student newspaper had published articles and photographs about a student demonstration in which police officers had
been hurt. Suspecting that the newspaper’s files might contain additional photographs of the melee that would help identify the assailants, police obtained an ex parte warrant and searched the newspa324
Outraged that the police had used a knock-on-theper’s offices.
door search rather than a subpoena duces tecum to obtain any relevant
photographs (of which there were none), the newspaper and its staff
brought a civil rights suit for declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the search violated their rights under the First and Fourth
325
Amendment.
After citing the obscenity cases for the idea that “unrestricted
power of search and seizure could also be an instrument for stifling
326
liberty of expression,” the Court then failed to heed its own admonition. Here, the fact that this was a newsroom seemed to add nothing
to the Court’s Fourth Amendment calculus, despite the newspaper’s
argument that the search would disrupt its operations, threaten its
ability to protect confidential sources, and chill its newsgathering ac327
All of these interests had been
tivities and editorial deliberations.
adequately protected, according to the Court, by the issuance of a
328
The Court’s approach, in effect, removed all substance
warrant.
from the “scrupulous exactitude” language; it requires courts to do
no more than what the Fourth Amendment already obligates them to
do in any case involving a search or seizure.
The Court went wrong in Zurcher by refusing to apply the analysis
it had commanded it Roaden; it failed to determine what was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment “in the light of the values of freedom of expression.” By placing too much emphasis on the fact that
“[i]n the normal course of events, search warrants are more difficult
329
to obtain than subpoenas, the Court assumed that the warrant re-

323
324
325
326
327
328
329

436 U.S. 547 (1978).
Id. at 550–51.
Id. at 550–52.
Id. at 564 (quoting Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 729 (1961)).
Id. at 563–64.
Id. at 565.
Id. at 562–63.
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quirement provides the highest level of constitutionally mandated
330
privacy protections in all circumstances. But a newsroom search is
not a normal event, and on these facts, a subpoena would have been
much more effective at guarding the newspaper’s valid First Amend331
In dissent, Justice Stewart catalogued the First
ment concerns.
Amendment values that the Court had ignored, concluding that
332
newsroom searches were “wholly inimical to the First Amendment.”
333
The decision unleashed a torrent of criticism from the press, com334
335
336
As a result,
mentators, legislators and various citizens’ groups.
Congress remedied the Court’s error two years later by passing the
337
Privacy Protection Act, which prohibits federal, state and local law
enforcement from searching newsrooms or seizing journalists’ work
product materials except in certain limited circumstances.
B. The Keith Case
While the Court’s misguided approach in Zurcher demonstrates
how the Fourth Amendment, when applied alone, can be insufficient
to protect First Amendment interests, the Court’s decision in United

330
331

332
333

334

335

336

337

In the words of Professor Amar, Zurcher is an example of the Court in thrall to “Fourth
Amendment worship of the warrant.” Amar, supra note 310, at 805.
Had police used a subpoena, a surprise intrusion by law enforcement into a working
newsroom, as well as the attendant police inspection of confidential files, would have
been avoided. Furthermore, a subpoena can be disputed or modified in court on disclosure grounds before compliance, while a search warrant cannot be challenged until after
it has been executed.
Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 573 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., James Kilpatrick, High Court and Freedom of the Press, TOLEDO BLADE, June 9, 1978,
at 16, https://news.google.com/newspapers?id=fxhPAAAAIBAJ&sjid=bAIEAAAAIBAJ
&pg=7002%2C3601292 (describing majority opinion in Zurcher as displaying an “astonishing ignorance of the real-world nature of the news-gathering process”); James Reston,
A Letter to the Whizzer, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1978, at A23 (suggesting that, under Zurcher,
President Nixon could have seized the Pentagon Papers and thereby prevented publication of stories based on those documents).
See, e.g., Charles L. Cantrell, Zurcher: Third Party Searches and Freedom of the Press, 62
MARQUETTE L. REV. 35, 36 (1978) (describing the decision as “a very real threat to the
freedom of the press”).
See, e.g., Richard L. Strout, Press Freedom Vote Sets Stage for Court Reassessment, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Sept. 25, 1980, at 7 (quoting House Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier that Zurcher
“swept away 200 years of jurisprudence greatly limiting searches directed against innocent
third parties”).
See, e.g., Birch Bayh, Police Searches of Innocent Third Parties: A Congressional Response to
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 6 J. LEGIS. 7, 8 (1979) (describing broad-based support for
Congressional reform in response to Zurcher ruling).
Pub. L. No. 96-440, 94 Stat. 1879 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (2012)).
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States v. U.S. District Court (the Keith case) 338 exemplifies how the two
Amendments can and should work together in cases involving the
First Amendment values associated with conversational privacy and
government surveillance.
The Keith case emerged out of the civil unrest of the late 1960s
339
The story began shortly before midnight on Sepand early 1970s.
tember 29, 1968, when several sticks of dynamite exploded outside a
Central Intelligence Agency recruitment office in Ann Arbor, Michi340
Although no one was hurt, the blast blew a hole in the sidegan.
walk, smashed windows and resulted in thousands of dollars of prop341
erty damage. A similar string of bombings had occurred in Detroit,
and within two weeks, another dynamite bomb went off in Ann Arbor, this time at the University of Michigan’s Institute of Science and
342
Technology.
About a year later, a federal grand jury indicted three members of
the White Panther Party, including Lawrence “Pun” Plamondon, for
destruction of government property in connection with the CIA of343
Before trial, the defense filed a motion to compel
fice bombing.
the government to disclose any records of electronic surveillance
conducted with respect to the defendants. In response, the government filed an affidavit from Attorney General John Mitchell admitting that Plamondon had been overheard by government agents on a
warrantless wiretap employed to collect intelligence regarding “subversive” domestic organizations deemed to be a threat to the national
344
The government argued that this surveillance, although
security.
conducted without any prior judicial approval, was nevertheless legal
345
pursuant to the President’s power to protect national security.
338
339

340
341
342
343
344
345

407 U.S. 297 313–15 (1972). “Keith” refers to Judge Damon J. Keith, the federal district
judge who heard the case.
Although the opinion contains scant discussion of the underlying facts, the case presented a fascinating back-story involving a Who’s Who of counterculture heroes and villains.
For more details regarding the case and its cast of characters, see Samuel C. Damren, The
Keith Case, 11 CT. LEGACY, at 1 (Historical Soc’y for the U.S. Dist. Court for the E. Dist.
Mich.) (Nov. 2003), https://members.fbamich.org/Portals/31/Documents/Newsletters/
200311_Court_Legacy.pdf; Trevor W. Morrison, The Story of United States v. United States
District Court (Keith): The Surveillance Power, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 287, 288
(Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009).
See Christopher Zbrozek, The Bombing of the A2 CIA Office, MICH. DAILY (Oct. 24, 2006),
http://www.michigandaily.com/content/bombing-a2-cia-office.
Id.
Id.
Morrison, supra note 339, at 291–93. The White Panthers were a radical activist group
patterned after the Black Panthers and formed by Plamondon and John Sinclair. Id.
Keith, 407 U.S. at 300.
Id. at 301.
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Judge Keith disagreed, holding that the surveillance violated the
Fourth Amendment and ordering the government to disclose the
346
The government chaloverheard conversations to the defense.
347
lenged Judge Keith’s order through a writ of mandamus, which
made Judge Keith the respondent in the appellate courts.
When the mandamus suit reached the Supreme Court in 1972, it
presented an issue that the Court specifically had left unaddressed in
Katz v. United States: “[w]hether safeguards other than prior authorization by a magistrate would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a situa348
The Court upheld Judge
tion involving the national security.”
Keith’s order, holding that the government must obtain a warrant be349
Imfore engaging in domestic national security surveillance.
portantly, the Court reached its holding by emphasizing the interplay
between the Fourth and First Amendments in surveillance cases, noting that while “the investigative duty of the executive may be stronger
in [national security] cases, so also is there greater jeopardy to consti350
tutionally protected speech.”
Writing for the Court, Justice Lewis Powell conceded that, at least
since the time of the Truman Administration, American Presidents
had employed electronic surveillance to protect the nation from both
351
But just because a practice is cominternal and foreign threats.
mon, Justice Powell observed, does not make it desirable. While electronic surveillance may at times be necessary to safeguard the public
interest, Justice Powell perceived the risk to privacy presented by government surveillance as both unsettling and frightening to law352
To protect that privacy, Justice Powell turned to
abiding citizens.
the Bill of Rights, noting that constitutional protections do not fall by
the wayside simply because the government cites national security as
its reason for engaging in surveillance. Quite the opposite, in fact—
Justice Powell stressed that national security cases “often reflect a
convergence of First and Fourth Amendment values not present in
353
cases of ‘ordinary’ crime.” History teaches that surveillance targets
are often chosen because of their unorthodox political beliefs; as a
346
347
348
349
350
351
352

353

Id.
Id.
389 U.S. 347, 358 n.23 (1967). See supra notes 132–38 and accompanying text.
Keith, 407 U.S. at 320.
Id. at 313.
Id. at 310–11.
Id. at 312 (“There is, understandably, a deep-seated uneasiness and apprehension that
this [surveillance] capability will be used to intrude upon cherished privacy of law-abiding
citizens.”).
Id. at 313.
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result, Justice Powell instructed courts to apply Fourth Amendment
safeguards with a sharp eye to protecting First Amendment rights:
The price of lawful public dissent must not be a dread of subjection to an
unchecked surveillance power. Nor must the fear of unauthorized official eavesdropping deter vigorous citizen dissent and discussion of Government action in private conversation. For private dissent, no less than
354
open public discourse, is essential to our free society.

Although the Fourth Amendment’s primary purpose was to prevent unauthorized government intrusions into the home, Justice
Powell cited Katz to emphasize that the Amendment’s “broader spirit
355
To
now shields private speech from unreasonable surveillance.”
the Keith Court, unreasonable surveillance, at least in the context of
356
To ensure that
domestic security, meant warrantless surveillance.
the constitutional values associated with conversational privacy are
guaranteed, Justice Powell insisted that the government obtain prior
judicial authorization before spying on Americans for domestic secu357
However, given the practical and policy considerarity purposes.
tions associated with national security surveillance, Justice Powell
suggested that Congress could enact special domestic security warrant
requirements different from those imposed by the federal wiretap
act. “Different standards may be compatible with the Fourth
Amendment,” he wrote, “if they are reasonable both in relation to the
legitimate need of Government for intelligence information and the
358
protected rights of our citizens.”
Finally, the Court stressed that it was expressing no opinion regarding whether the President could engage in warrantless electronic
359
While
surveillance with respect to foreign powers or their agents.
the Court admitted that the distinction between domestic and foreign security surveillance might, in other cases, be hard to draw, the
government here had presented no evidence that a foreign power
had been directly or indirectly implicated in the CIA bombing. Attorney General Mitchell’s affidavit established that Plamondon’s calls
had been overheard on wiretaps employed to gather intelligence re354
355
356

357
358
359

Id. at 314.
Id. at 313.
The Court’s insistence on a warrant exemplifies what has been described as the “warrant
preference model of reasonableness”—a view that the modern Court has moved away
from, at least at times, in favor of a balancing approach. Cynthia Lee, Reasonableness With
Teeth: The Future of Fourth Amendment Reasonableness Analysis, 81 MISS. L.J. 1133, 1135
(2012).
Keith, 407 U.S. at 318. (“Prior review by a neutral and detached magistrate is the timetested means of effectuating Fourth Amendment rights.”).
Id. at 322–23.
Id. at 308–09, 321–22.
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garding threats posed by domestic organizations, a term that the
Court defined as “a group or organization (whether formally or informally constituted) composed of citizens of the United States and
which has no significant connection with a foreign power, its agents
360
or agencies.” While Plamondon may have been involved in a criminal conspiracy, the government had no reason to suspect him of associating or collaborating with foreign terrorists.
Although Keith was decided more than 40 years ago, the opinion
continues to be the Court’s most significant analysis of the constitutional questions pertaining to warrantless electronic surveillance of
American citizens. In that regard, Keith teaches at least three important lessons that remain relevant today. First, the case reminds us
that even when government surveillance is justified to protect valid
national interests, it is properly classified as a necessary evil. It must
be used cautiously and sparingly, because “even when employed with
restraint and under judicial supervision,” surveillance creates anxiety
361
and distrust among law-abiding citizens. Secret, warrantless surveillance violates our constitutional norms; the Bill of Rights leads us to
expect that, if we haven’t done anything wrong, the government will
respect our valued right to conversational privacy.
Second, Keith establishes that First Amendment interests must be
both recognized and accorded real weight in determining whether
government surveillance of domestic communications comports with
the Fourth Amendment. In a field like national security where First
and Fourth Amendment values converge, the Keith case tells courts to
consider those rights in tandem rather than in isolation. According
to Justice Powell, courts must balance the government’s duty to protect national security against the potential danger surveillance poses
362
Imagine a Venn
to both “individual privacy and free expression.”
diagram that illustrates overlapping spheres; where First and Fourth
Amendment forces unite, the protections of both Amendments reinforce and gain strength from each other.
The third lesson to take from Keith is that the distinction between
domestic and foreign security is to be determined not only based on
the purpose of the surveillance, but also on the characteristics of the
individuals or groups being surveilled. Attorney General Mitchell’s
affidavit established that Plamondon’s calls had been overheard on
wiretaps employed to gather intelligence regarding threats posed by
360
361
362

Id. at 309 n.8.
Id. at 312.
Keith, 407 U.S. at 314–15.
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domestic organizations; Plamondon himself was not the target. 363 A
member of the defense team later speculated that Plamondon’s calls
from Algeria, where he was hiding, to the Oakland headquarters of
364
We
the Black Panthers had been captured by an NSA intercept.
will never know the details, because the government chose to dismiss
the charges against Plamondon rather than disclose the surveillance
365
records. My point, however, is simply that foreign collection should
not change the constitutional analysis when the government takes advantage of our global communications network to both harvest and
analyze in bulk, vast amounts of metadata relating to the communications of U.S. persons who have “no significant connection with a for366
eign power, its agents or agencies.”
C. Applying Keith to Bulk Collection of Domestic Communications Metadata
Assuming that courts, applying Keith, recognize the synergy of privacy and speech when determining Fourth Amendment challenges to
government surveillance programs, what difference would that
recognition make with respect to the bulk collection of communications metadata? Would the First Amendment values associated with
conversational privacy even come close to changing the Fourth
Amendment balance of interests when the prevention of terrorist attacks is the government’s countervailing concern? The answer, as is
almost always the case with a balancing test, is “It depends.”
First, consider the government’s argument that the collection and
later analysis of communications metadata does not rise to the level
of a Fourth Amendment seizure or search because communicators
have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the transactional information they share with their telecommunications providers. This
claim, based on Smith v. Maryland, was the centerpiece of the government’s constitutional defense of the former Section 215 pro367
gram, and, as described in Part I, has been cited by the government
to justify the NSA’s unlimited contact chaining of domestic metadata
368
collected under EO 12333.
363
364
365
366

367
368

Id. at 300 n.2.
See Morrison, supra note 339, at 296.
See Damren, supra note 339, at 8.
Keith, 407 U.S. at 309 n.8. Of course, Congress recognized this with respect to targeting
of U.S. persons who are located abroad, which requires a FISA warrant. However, as explained in Part I, bulk collections of communications metadata are not covered under
that provision. See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text.
See ADMIN. WHITE PAPER, supra note 29, at 19–20.
See supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text.
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As detailed in Part II, a strong case can be made under the Fourth
Amendment, considered by itself, that the third party doctrine is both
outdated and inaccurate with respect to our expectations of privacy
369
The assumption of the risk rationale on which
in the digital age.
Smith was based was highly questionable in 1979, and later changes in
technology—which require us to create digital third-party trails to
send an email, search the Internet, or use our cell phones—have
eviscerated that rationale entirely. Justice Marshall’s observation in
his Smith dissent is even truer today: “It is idle to speak of ‘assuming’
risks in contexts where, as a practical matter, individuals have no real370
Some lower courts have begun to recognize the
istic alternative.”
inadequacies of the third party doctrine in the context of cell-site location data, holding that government collection of location-tracking
information for an extended period without a warrant violates cell371
phone users’ reasonable expectations of privacy.
This conclusion, that citizens do not expect the government to
use privately owned cell phones as digital tracking tools, makes good
sense. It is even more reasonable for citizens to assume that the government will respect their right to conversational and associational
privacy under the First Amendment. As shown in Part III, communications metadata is often just as revealing as the underlying messages
themselves; studies show that the content/non-content distinction
372
does not hold up. Email and phone records provide private details
about conversations and relationships that law-abiding citizens right373
fully consider to be none of the government’s business. According
to the Keith Court, both the public fear of pervasive government surveillance, and the potential for future abuse of collected data, present

369
370
371

372
373

See supra notes 155–80 and accompanying text.
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 750 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 796 F. 3d 332, 355–61 (4th Cir. 2015), reh’g granted en
banc, No. 12-4825, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 19064 (4th Cir. Oct. 28, 2015) (distinguishing
Smith v. Maryland to hold that law enforcement must procure a warrant to obtain longterm cell site location records); In re Application of U.S. for an Order Directing a Provider of Electronic Communication Service to Disclose Records to the Government, 620 F.3d
304, 317–18 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that third party doctrine does not apply to cell site
location information generated by cell phone service providers). But see United States v.
Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 511–12 (11th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 84 U.S.L.W. 3257 (U.S. Nov. 9,
2015) (applying third party doctrine to hold that cell phone users voluntarily convey cell
site location information to their service providers); In re Application of U.S. for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 614–15 (5th Cir. 2013) (same).
See supra notes 204–215 and accompanying text.
See Pew 2014 Study, supra note 1, at 22 (finding that, following the Snowden disclosures,
close to 80% of Americans agreed or strongly agreed that the nation should be concerned about government monitoring of phone calls and emails).
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dangers to free expression that deserve weight in the Fourth
Amendment analysis. By combining these First and Fourth Amendment interests against the eroding justifications for the third party
doctrine, the Court should recognize that U.S. persons have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their communications metadata.
Depending on one’s overall view of the third party doctrine, either a
benefit or a short-coming of the Keith approach is that it allows the
Court to limit the third party doctrine in the communications context, without having to discard the doctrine in its entirety.
Determining that the collection and analysis of communications
metadata constitutes a search and seizure within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, however, does not mean that the government
surveillance program necessarily is prohibited. The government will
argue, as it did in the former Section 215 telephony metadata con374
text, that even if the third party doctrine does not apply, the government’s interest in preventing foreign terrorism outweighs any
minimal privacy interest associated with the collection and analysis of
incidentally acquired domestic communications metadata under EO
12333. While the Keith Court reserved the question of whether the
375
warrant clause is subject to a foreign intelligence exception, the
FISA Court of Review in 2008 recognized such an exception and applied a reasonableness test to reject a telecommunications company’s
376
Fourth Amendment challenge to a foreign intercept order. Lower
courts consistently have held that when the government collects information abroad concerning a U.S. person, a reasonableness test, ra377
Even in the criminal
ther than the warrant requirement, applies.
law context, the Court in recent years has moved towards a “reasona-

374

375
376
377

See ADMIN. WHITE PAPER, supra note 29, at 21 (“The telephony metadata collection is also
consistent with the First Amendment” because “the program does not collect the content
of any communications and . . . the data may be queried only when the Government has a
reasonable, articulable suspicion that a particular number is associated with a specific
foreign terrorist organization.”).
407 U.S. 297, 308–09, 321–22 (1972).
In re Directives [Redacted] Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F. 3d 1004, 1011–13 (Foreign Intel. Surveillance Ct. of Rev. 2008).
See, e.g., United States v. Stokes, 726 F.3d 880, 893 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding that with respect to extraterritorial search by U.S. agents of U.S. citizen’s home, Fourth Amendment
requires application of reasonableness test rather than warrant requirement); In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552 F.3d 157, 167 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding
that wiretapping and search of U.S. citizen’s home that occurs overseas is governed by
Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard, not warrant requirement); United States v.
Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 490 (9th Cir. 1987) (applying reasonableness test that considered
U.S. agents’ compliance with foreign law in Fourth Amendment calculation).
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bleness view” of the Fourth Amendment, 378 pursuant to which it looks
to the totality of the circumstances and balances the legitimate government interests served by the search against the individual interests
379
involved.
On the government’s side of the ledger, the executive branch argues that surveillance conducted pursuant to EO 12333 serves the
undeniably significant interest in the prevention of potentially cata380
According to the NSA, communications
strophic terrorist attacks.
metadata collected under EO 12333 help the NSA to “understand
where to find valid foreign intelligence information needed to protect U.S. national security interests in a large and complicated global
network” and to “map communications between terrorists and their
381
National security—the same interest that the governassociates.”
ment used to justify surveillance in Keith—and the fight against foreign terrorism repeatedly have been described by courts as interests
382
of the highest magnitude. As a result, the balancing exercise starts
with a heavy hand on the scale in favor of the government.
These are the identical concerns, of course, that the government
used to justify bulk collection of domestic telephony metadata under
the former Section 215. Assuming for the sake of argument that collection under the former Section 215 amounted to a Fourth
Amendment search or seizure, the Obama Administration defended
the reasonableness of that program not only by reciting the government’s weighty interest in terrorism prevention, but also by pointing
to various privacy safeguards and minimization procedures with
which the NSA was required to comply. For example, the govern378
379

380

381
382

See Lee, supra note 356, at 1134–35 (contrasting the Court’s former “warrant preference
view” of the Fourth Amendment with the current “reasonableness view”).
See, e.g., Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 847–48 (2006) (“‘[U]nder our general Fourth
Amendment Approach’ we ‘examin[e] the totality of the circumstances’ to determine
whether a search is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” (quoting
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118 (2001) (alteration in original)); Florida v.
Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991) (“The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.”); see also Amar, supra note 310, at 759 (“We need to read the [Fourth]
Amendment’s words and take them seriously: they do not require warrants, probable
cause, or exclusion of evidence, but they do require that all searches and seizures be reasonable.”).
See EO 12333, supra note 13, at Preamble. (“Timely, accurate, and insightful information
about the activities, capabilities, plans, and intentions of foreign powers, organizations,
and persons, and their agents, is essential to the national security of the United States.”).
See NSA Memorandum, supra note 14, at 3.
See, e.g., Holder v. Humanitarian Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28 (2010) (“Everyone agrees that the
Government’s interest in combating terrorism is an urgent objective of the highest order.”); In re Directives, 551 F.3d at 1012 (“[T]he relevant governmental interest—the interest in national security—is of the highest order of magnitude.”).
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ment emphasized that FISC orders limited the NSA’s ability to query
383
or disseminate the collected metadata, and the program was subject
to monitoring by the FISC, Congress, the Department of Justice, and
384
the intelligence community. Likewise, in upholding bulk telephony
metadata collection against a Fourth Amendment challenge, a federal district court cited executive, congressional, and FISC oversight as
385
Opponents of the forevidence of the program’s reasonableness.
mer Section 215 collection regime naturally disputed the adequacy of
these safeguards to minimize privacy harms but, sufficient or not,
386
they contributed to the overall reasonableness analysis.
As described in Part I, when the NSA engages in foreign-based
electronic surveillance, it incidentally acquires large numbers of U.S.
person communications, including calls made by Americans to people in foreign countries, and communications among Americans that
happen to transit through international cables, or are stored on
387
In both the criminal
backup servers located in foreign countries.
law and foreign intelligence contexts, however, the mere fact that
non-pertinent communications are collected as part of authorized
388
surveillance does not make the surveillance unreasonable. Rather,
courts look to the adequacy of minimization procedures whereby the
government tries to avoid or ameliorate the privacy intrusions associ389
ated with those incidental interceptions.
So, for example, in 2014 a federal district court held that warrantless surveillance under Section 702 of FISA was reasonable because
FISA-approved targeting and minimization procedures adequately
protected the privacy of U.S. persons whose communications were

383
384
385
386

387
388

389

ADMIN. WHITE PAPER, supra note 29, at 15, 21.
Id. at 4–5.
ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 757 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), rev’d on other grounds, 785
F.3d 787, 826 (2d Cir. 2015).
For a summary of the objections to the former Section 215 program minimization procedures, see Susan Freiwald, Nothing to Fear or Nowhere to Hide: Competing Visions of the NSA’s
215 Program, 12 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 309, 324–25 (2014).
See supra notes 79–88 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 157–58 (1974) (finding that conversations
collected between a named party and an unspecific party is allowed); In re Directives
[Redacted] Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551
F.3d 1004, 1015 (Foreign Intel. Surveillance Ct. of Rev. 2008) (noting that incidental collections do not render the collection unlawful).
See, e.g., Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 140–42 (1978) (examining the facts and circumstances of the wiretap to determine whether the minimization procedure were adequate); In Re Directives, 551 F.3d at 1015 (finding that the minimization procedures were
adequate).

Feb. 2016]

SYNERGY OF PRIVACY AND SPEECH

885

incidentally acquired. 390 In conducting the reasonableness analysis,
the court also emphasized the existence of congressional, as well as
FISC, oversight of the program based on specific statutory reporting
391
requirements. The court pointed to procedures limiting the retention and dissemination of foreign communications of or concerning
U.S. persons, and requiring that the identity of U.S. persons be delet392
ed in certain circumstances.
But minimization procedures that apply to FISA-based surveillance, including the Section 215 domestic telephony metadata collection program as reconstituted by the Freedom Act, do not apply to
393
The NSA’s EO
signals intelligence gathered under EO 12333.
12333 surveillance activities are not subject to FISC approval or review, nor has Congress chosen to subject those activities to significant
394
legislative oversight. And while the Attorney General has approved
minimization procedures that govern the NSA’s collection, analysis,
and retention of U.S. person information acquired pursuant to EO
12333 surveillance, as detailed in Part I, those procedures are much
less robust with respect to the incidental acquisition, and later analysis, of domestic communications metadata than they are with respect
395
For example, Part I showed how, altto communication content.
hough the Freedom Act limits the NSA’s ability to contact chain Section 215 domestic telephony metadata out to two hops, under
SPCMA, the NSA may contact chain EO 12333-collected metadata
through U.S. person identifiers in an unlimited manner. And while
the Freedom Act requires the NSA to purge metadata determined to
be irrelevant to foreign intelligence, communication records obtained under EO 12333 may be retained by the government for at
least five years.
Another critical factor in determining whether incidental collection is, in fact, reasonable under the Fourth Amendment is its
396
Enormousness can negate reasonableness. The FISC recscope.
390
391
392
393

394

395
396

United States v. Mohamud, No. 3:10-CR-00475-KI-1, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85452, at *72–73
(D. Ore., June 24,2013).
Id. at *63–64.
Id. at *65–66.
See NSA Memorandum, supra note 14, at 2 (“Collection pursuant to EO 12333 is conducted through various means around the globe, largely from outside the United States,
which is not otherwise regulated by FISA.”).
See Watkins, supra note 74 (quoting head of the Senate Intelligence Committee as saying
that Congress does not “sufficiently” oversee EO 12333 surveillance because it falls under
executive authority).
See supra notes 89–110 and accompanying text.
See e.g., PCLOB Section 702 Report, supra note 93, at 96 (stating that the scope of the incidental collection of U.S. persons’ communications under Section 702 of FISA “raise
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ognized this in 2011, when Judge John D. Bates refused to reapprove
NSA targeting and minimization procedures with respect to targeted
acquisition of foreign Internet communications pursuant to Section
397
The government had informed Judge Bates that, be702 of FISA.
398
cause of “technological challenges,” the NSA had and would continue incidentally to acquire tens of thousands of wholly domestic
emails that had been routed internationally and that had no direct
399
connection to the surveillance target. Judge Bates ordered the NSA
to stop email collection until the process could be better tailored to
400
satisfy the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement, stating that “[t]here surely are circumstances in which incidental intrusions can be so substantial as to render a search or seizure unreason401
able.”
How much metadata relating to the communications of U.S. persons who have “no significant connection with a foreign power, its
402
agents or agencies” does the NSA collect pursuant to its authority
under EO 12333? The NSA isn’t telling, but press reports indicate
the scope of collection is massive. For example, in 2013 the Washington Post reported that under EO 12333, the NSA collects “hundreds of
millions” of email address books and instant-messaging “buddy lists”
belonging to people around the world, including many Americans, as
403
Although two unthat data travels over international data routes.
named intelligence officials declined to estimate how many Americans’ contact lists were swept up in the dragnet, they “did not dispute
404
that the number is likely to be in the millions or tens of millions.”
As Alvaro Bedoya noted on the Just Security blog, the volume of incidental collection of U.S. person communications under EO 12333

397
398
399
400
401
402
403

404

questions about whether its impact on U.S. persons pushes the program over the edge into constitutional unreasonableness”); Alvaro Bedoya, Executive Order 12333 and the Golden
Number, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 9, 2014, 10:14 AM) (examining the reasonableness standard
under the Fourth Amendment).
FISC Memorandum Opinion (FISA Ct., Oct. 3, 2011) (Bates, J.), http://www.dni.gov/
files/documents/0716/October-2011-Bates-Opinion-and%20Order-20140716.pdf.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 72.
Id. at 78–79.
Id. at 75.
Keith, 407 U.S. 297, 309 n.8 (1972).
Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Collects Millions of E-mail Address Books Globally,
WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/
nsa-collects-millions-of-e-mail-address-books-globally/2013/10/14/8e58b5be-34f9-11e380c6-7e6dd8d22d8f_story.html.
Id.
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appears to be much larger than the mere tens of thousands of U.S.
405
email communications that concerned Judge Bates.
The scope of incidental collection of American communications
metadata under EO 12333 is also vital from a speech perspective.
There is enormous First Amendment value in ensuring that major
American communications systems—including telephone companies
and Internet service providers—are not co-opted, infiltrated, or infected by the government in a way that threatens the sanctity of our
406
Free speech and a free press are requicitizens’ communications.
site components of a democratic system, and the existence of an “in407
frastructure of free expression” creates the public trust needed for
a democracy to function. That trust has been shaken by the Snowden
revelations; it could be destroyed if citizens realize that, thanks to
government overreaching under EO 12333, the Freedom Act’s touted
408
While whistlesurveillance reforms are more illusory than real.
409
blower John Napier Tye may have had only limited success so far at
bringing EO 12333 to the attention of ordinary Americans, for all we
know, the next Edward Snowden could be waiting in the wings.
Finally, any evaluation of Fourth Amendment reasonableness
must also include a cost-benefit analysis. Privacy and speech concerns
associated with pervasive government surveillance can only be outweighed by legitimate national security interests if, in fact, the program has value in the fight against terrorism. For this reason, after
concluding that the former Section 215 program had not prevented
410
any terrorist attacks, the PCLOB called for a halt, and the Presi405
406

407
408

409
410

See Bedoya, supra note 396 (noting that the number of emails collected outnumber the
tens of thousands that worried Judge Bates).
Documents leaked by Edward Snowden continue to reveal how the government has partnered with telecommunication companies to implement mass surveillance programs. For
example, in August 2015, the New York Times and ProPublica reported that AT&T provided
the NSA with access to billions of telephone and email records from 2001 to 2013. Julia
Angwin, et al., AT&T Helped U.S. Spy on Internet on a Vast Scale, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2015,
at A1.
See Balkin, supra note 122, at 4 (describing the role of data processing systems in distributing the benefits of modern citizenship).
See Pew 2014 Study, supra note 1, at 23–25 (concluding that, following the Snowden disclosures, most Americans felt insecure sharing private information over landline phones,
cell phones, email and social media.). The same study found that only 18% of American
adults said they expect the federal government to do “the right thing” all or most of the
time, and close to 80% agreed or strongly agreed that the nation should be concerned
about government monitoring of phone calls and emails. Id. at 22, 28.
See supra notes 112–13 and accompanying text.
See PCLOB Section 215 Report, supra note 7, at 11 (“Based on the information provided
to the Board, including classified briefings and documentation, we have not identified a
single instance involving a threat to the United States in which the program made a con-
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dent’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technology (“PRG”) recommended significant reforms, to the former Sec411
We can assume
tion 215 telephony metadata collection program.
that overseas surveillance conducted under EO 12333 has provided
the intelligence community with essential information over the years
with respect to national security. However, the relevant inquiry here
is whether the government’s use of international methods to incidentally collect and analyze metadata associated with Americans’ essentially domestic communications is justified in the fight against terrorism. Could the government use technology to limit its intake of
American communications records under EO 12333 such that the
program would still be effective? Does the NSA intentionally drive
domestic Internet communications through international transit
routes so as to collect it under EO 12333? Has the NSA thwarted any
terrorist plots as a result of allowing enhanced analysis of U.S. person
communications metadata under SPCMA? Given the secrecy surrounding EO 12333, we just don’t know.
D. A Way Forward
Until the Supreme Court loosens the overly rigid standing re412
quirements it adopted in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, a constitutional challenge to incidental collection of domestic communica413
tion records under EO 12333 is a virtual impossibility.
Nevertheless, given the important First and Fourth Amendment interests upon which such surveillance intrudes, both Congress and the
executive branch can and should take steps to provide meaningful
privacy protections with respect to EO 12333 collection and analysis
of the communications records of U.S. persons. Below, I have listed
some suggestions.
1. The public and Congress need more information regarding the scope of
NSA surveillance conducted under EO 12333. The Snowden leaks trig-

411

412
413

crete difference in the outcome of a counterterrorism investigation.”); PRG Report, supra
note 85, at 104 (“Our review suggests that the information contributed to terrorist investigations by the use of section 215 telephony meta-data was not essential to preventing attacks and could readily have been obtained in a timely manner using conventional section 215 orders.”).
See PCLOB Section 215 Report, supra note 7, at 168 (recommending to stop the Section
215 bulk telephone records program); PRG Report, supra note 85, at 115–29 (recommending several modifications to the Section 215 program such as changing the storage
of the data from the government to a private third party).
133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
See supra notes 357–71 and accompanying text.
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gered both official inquiries and public debate regarding the NSA’s
collection of bulk domestic telephony metadata under the former
Section 215. As a result, Congress stepped in and, with the Freedom
Act, imposed some important limits on that program. The democratic process worked. An unfortunate side effect of the Freedom Act,
however, is that many Americans now believe—incorrectly—that their
communications metadata are no longer being collected in bulk,
held and analyzed by the NSA. Even worse, members of Congress
similarly may be in the dark, given the pervasive secrecy surrounding
the scope of incidental collections of American communications records under EO 12333. To the extent that national security allows,
Congress and the American people need sufficient information regarding the scope and efficacy of metadata collection and analysis
conducted under EO 12333 to determine whether the accompanying
burden on our constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties is, in fact,
justified.
As a possible first step, the PCLOB in 2014 announced its intention to examine two counterterrorism-related intelligence community
activities governed by EO 12333. Its goal was to provide, by the end
of 2015, two written, classified reports assessing the balance between
each of those activities and privacy, as well as possible recommenda414
tions to enhance civil liberties. Additionally, the PCLOB said it intends to release a public report explaining how the government uses
EO 12333 and its implementing procedures to collect, retain, and
415
disseminate information about U.S. persons. It is, of course, impossible to know how much useful data the public report will present, or
how receptive the executive branch will be to any reform suggestions
contained in the classified reports. In 2013, the White House refused
to adopt a PRG recommendation meant to apply to EO 12333 activities, stating that to do so would require “significant changes” to regu416
lar EO 12333 procedures.
Another question that needs answering is the extent to which
Congress and its relevant subcommittees are briefed regarding surveillance activities under EO 12333. Senator Dianne Feinstein, for-

414

415
416

See PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., PCLOB EXAMINATION OF E.O. 12333
ACTIVITIES IN 2015, at 1 (2015), https://www.pclob.gov/library/20150408EO12333_Project_Description.pdf (describing the Board’s intended process for reviewing two counterterrorism related activities governed by EO 12333).
Id.
See Tye, supra note 111 (explaining that Recommendation 12 of the PRG Report was understood by the White House to be intended to apply to EO 12333, and that the President
had no plans to implement the recommendation).
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mer chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, has said that the
committee has not exercised “sufficient” oversight of those activi417
Accordingly, as it did with the Church Committee in the
ties.
1970s, Congress should hold hearings or otherwise investigate the
scope of the NSA’s incidental collection of domestic communications
under EO 12333. If the Freedom Act is actually a “huge nothing418
burger” for the privacy community, both Congressional leaders and
the American people are entitled to know it.
2. Congress must enact further surveillance reforms. Certainly Congress has the power and the duty not only to investigate the extent of
intelligence agencies’ surveillance activities, but also to propose, enact, and update limits on those activities, as exemplified by passage of
419
the original FISA as well as the Freedom Act. However, restrictions
placed by the Freedom Act on the NSA’s ability to collect, analyze,
and retain domestic communications metadata are meaningless if the
NSA can conduct virtually the same activities under EO 12333. Accordingly, Congress should, to the extent possible, subject NSA
metadata collection and analysis under EO 12333 to comparable limits imposed by the Freedom Act. In particular, given that the NSA
under SPCMA can analyze metadata without establishing a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a particular phone number or email
420
address is associated with international terrorism, Congress should
forbid the NSA from contact chaining through U.S. identifiers. The
NSA should also be required promptly to destroy all domestic communication records determined to be irrelevant to foreign intelligence. Additionally, Congress should force the NSA to provide notice to criminal defendants when evidence to be used in court against
them has been derived from EO 12333 surveillance, as it must with
421
respect to surveillance under Section 702 of FISA. Finally, Congress
should also mandate that the Director of National Intelligence pro417
418
419

420
421

See Watkins, supra note 74 (detailing the expansion of NSA authority under EO 12333).
See Harris, supra note 71 (explaining that the Freedom Act, by forcing phone companies
to hold on to records, does not suspend the NSA’s record program).
In 2014, Congress set limits on how long intelligence agencies can retain data collected
under EO 12333. See Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, Pub. L. No. 113293, § 309, 128 Stat. 3990 (2014) (listing limitations on data retention). Following the
Act’s passage, Sen. Ron Wyden indicated that although those limits did not meaningfully
restrict the NSA, the Act nevertheless created a precedent for Congress to impose a legislative framework on EO 12333 surveillance activities. See Ellen Nakashima, Congress Sets
Limits on Overseas Data Collection, WASH. POST (Dec. 17, 2014), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/congress-sets-limits-on-overseas-datacollection/2014/12/17/82972c6e-8558-11e4-a702-fa31ff4ae98e_story.html.
See supra notes 100–04 and accompanying text.
See supra note 299 and accompanying text.
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vide an annual report to Congress—classified in whole or part, as
necessary—regarding surveillance activities conducted under EO
12333, including a good faith estimate of the scope of NSA incidental
collection of American communications.
3. The President should amend EO 12333 to reflect modern communications technology. EO 12333 was adopted in 1981, before development
of the Internet and global telecommunications networks made national borders irrelevant with respect to Americans’ ability to communicate. EO 12333 needs to be updated to reflect these new technologies, and to acknowledge that domestic communications do not
lose their constitutional protections because they happen to be stored
on a backup server located in a foreign country, or flow through an
international cable on their way across town. In this regard, Presidential Policy Directive 28 (PPD-28), which indicates that “signals in422
telligence shall be as tailored as feasible,” may be a step on the path
to reform. Section one, “Principles Governing the Collection of Signals Intelligence,” states as follows:
Privacy and civil liberties shall be integral considerations in the planning
of U.S. signals intelligence activities. The United States shall not collect
signals intelligence for the purpose of suppressing or burdening criticism
or dissent, or for disadvantaging persons based on their ethnicity, race,
423
gender, sexual orientation, or religion.”

Recall from Part I, however, that the NSA’s definition of “collect”
424
does not include contact chaining and other analysis of metadata.
And it is unclear how PPD-28 relates to EO 12333, given that a later
footnote states that “this directive is not intended to alter the rules
425
applicable to U.S. persons in Executive Order 12333.” Again, more
information is needed to clarify whether and how PPD-28 applies to
the collection and analysis of U.S. person communications metadata
under EO 12333.
4. The Attorney General should reject SCPMA. Regardless of whether
Congress enacts statutory limitations, the Attorney General should return the NSA to pre-SCPMA guidelines regarding the analysis of U.S.
person communications metadata gathered under EO 12333. As described in Part I, prior to 2010, NSA analysts stopped contact chaining communications metadata when they encountered a U.S. person
426
The Attorney General approved
phone number or email address.
422
423
424
425
426

PPD-28, supra note 79, at § 1(d).
Id. at § 1(b).
See supra notes 105–09 and accompanying text.
PPD-28, supra note 79, at § 4(a) n.9.
See supra notes 94–99 and accompanying text.
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SPCMA based on the argument that U.S. persons have no reasonable
expectation of privacy in communications metadata because of the
427
third party doctrine —a position that is outdated and inaccurate,
especially when considered in light both the First and Fourth
Amendment values associated with conversational privacy. Unless the
NSA can demonstrate that unlimited contact chaining and other
augmented analysis of U.S. persons’ communications metadata has
been instrumental in the nation’s fight against terrorism, SPCMA will
fail a Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis that properly includes First Amendment interests in the balance.
5. The President should name a civilian to head the NSA. In its report
on surveillance, the PRG suggested that greater civilian control of the
NSA could increase its sensitivity to the privacy concerns of ordinary
428
It surmised that decisions regarding surveillance for
Americans.
counterterrorism purposes could be overly influenced by the combat
needs of the military in Iraq and Afghanistan, especially considering
that today, the same digital devices, operating systems, applications,
routers, and fiber optic cables are used for both civilian and military
429
communications. While during military operations, surveillance directed towards our enemies must be “highly aggressive and largely
unrestrained,” the PRG noted that at home, the government must
430
It recomtake care not to undermine communications privacy.
mended that the NSA director should be a Senate-confirmed position, and that the President should “give serious consideration” to
431
appointing a civilian as the next NSA Director, which would necessitate splitting off the U.S. Cyber Command military unit from the
432
NSA—another one of the PRG’s recommendations.
Although the President reportedly had his staff draft a list of possible civilian candidates for the post when General Keith Alexander
stepped down in 2014, the President ultimately appointed another
433
military officer to lead the agency. While I have no reason to doubt
the qualifications or ability of Admiral Michael Rogers, it is telling
that the New York Times immediately noted he had “no public track
record in addressing the kind of privacy concerns that have put the
427
428
429
430
431
432
433

Id.
PRG Report, supra note 85, at 179–83.
Id. at 185–87.
Id. at 186–87.
Id. at 188.
Id. at 190.
David E. Sanger & Thom Shanker, N.S.A. Choice Is Expert on Cyberwar, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/31/world/vice-admiral-to-be-named-nsadirector.html?_r=0.
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agency under a harsh spotlight.” 434 The idea that the government
should develop different surveillance policies for military versus noncombat operations is worth future consideration. In that regard, the
next head of the NSA should be a civilian who is subject to a Senate
confirmation hearing where he or she must respond to elected representatives’ concerns regarding agency overreach and the intrusions
on privacy that accompany pervasive surveillance programs. This
would both increase agency accountability, and help rebuild public
trust in an agency thought by many to have drastically overstepped its
bounds in the name of national security.
CONCLUSION
While no one can dispute the intelligence community’s legitimate
need to protect our nation, we must not forget Justice Powell’s admonition that even when used sparingly, surveillance threatens our
civil liberties and causes law-abiding citizens to distrust their govern435
As technology evolves and our society becomes ever more
ment.
dependent on digital devices, we can expect that massive government
surveillance programs will continue to proliferate. If the government’s surveillance power is left unchecked, we risk finding ourselves
living in a world sociologists describe as the “surveillant assemblage,”
where law-abiding citizens who, in earlier times, were never the target
of government surveillance, have become subject to routine monitor436
The implications with respect to privacy, creativity, dissent,
ing.
personal and political association, as well as the operation of a free
press and our democratic processes, are enormous.
With the passage of the Freedom Act, Congress supposedly
curbed the NSA’s ability to spy on ordinary Americans by taking the
agency out of the domestic metadata collection business entirely. In
truth, however, the new law did nothing to limit the NSA’s ability to
capitalize on the global nature of modern communications networks
to collect and analyze most of those same records in bulk under EO
12333. Both Congress and the public need more information about
how, under EO 12333, the NSA scoops up and analyzes phone, email,
and other communication records belonging not only to foreign ter434
435
436

Id.
United States v. U.S District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 312 (1972). See supra note 352 and accompanying text.
See Kevin D. Haggerty & Richard V. Ericson, The Surveillant Assemblage, 51 BRIT. J. OF
SOCIOL. 605, 606 (2000) (describing how a “surveillant assemblage” transforms the purposes of surveillance to encompass individuals who formerly were not subjected to it).
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rorists, but also to innocent Americans. Additionally, Congress
should act to ensure that the intelligence community cannot use EO
12333 to evade statutory and constitutional protections by capturing
Americans’ communications from foreign sources.
Additional statutory and executive branch reforms are essential,
given that under current Court precedent, a constitutional challenge
to incidental collection of domestic communications metadata under
EO 12333 might well fail. Even assuming that a litigant could overcome the near-insurmountable obstacles to standing imposed by
437
Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, courts in Fourth Amendment
cases have applied the third party doctrine to hold that Americans
have no reasonable expectation of privacy in their communications
metadata. Alternatively, under First Amendment case law, government surveillance programs that do not target any particular group,
or prohibit or punish speech, are unlikely to be seen as presenting an
actionable chilling effect on speech or association.
My central theme has been that the First Amendment, when considered in partnership with the Fourth, can and should play a role in
protecting us against becoming the surveillant assemblage. Both
courts and the executive branch should avoid viewing the Bill of
Rights as merely creating narrow, isolated zones of protection for our
rights of privacy and speech. The risk with such an overly insular
analysis, of course, is that a governmental activity that straddles the
two constitutional provisions may simply fall into the resulting black
hole between the constitutional guarantees. A better approach in
addressing the momentous speech and communications privacy issues associated with bulk government surveillance programs would be
to read the provisions of the First Amendment together with those of
the Fourth. The First Amendment value of communications privacy
must be factored into the determination of whether a government
surveillance program violates the Fourth Amendment. As the Court
demonstrated in the Keith case, when the two Amendments are taken
in tandem, as pieces of the same cloth, they create a force field that
extends the protections of each.

437

133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013). See infra notes 286–307 and accompanying text.

